M3 


UC-NRLF 


CO 

o 
o 
r- 
o 

IQ 


^ 


Zbc  llnivcrsitv?  ot  Cbicaoo 

l-iilNllKl)    BV    JOHN    U.    KOCKKfKl.l.HK 


The  Impersonal  Judgment: 

Its    Nature^   Origin,   and    Significance 


A     niSSKklAllON     PRKSENTED     ID     IHK     FACULTY     Ol"    AR'IS,     I.HKKA- 

TUKE.    AND     SCIENCE     OF      IHK     UNIVERSITY    OF     CHICAGO, 

IN    CANDIDACY     FOK      IHK     DEGREE     OF    DOCTOR     OK 

I'liii  osoi-m- 


l)F.I'ARTMENT    OF    PHlLOSUl'llY 


By  SIMON   FRASFR   MacI.I.W.W 


^ 


ciiiCA(;() 
•irt)e  tlnibfcsitjp  of  vTbirago  tlrrsa 

1897 


^ 


V 


THK     IMl'i;i<S().\  \1.     irixiMIlN  I- :     ITS    NATURE,  ORK;iX, 

AM)   SKiMi-R'AXCK. 

The  consideration  of  such  expressions  as  "wci,  x/-"/,  pluii,  inich  hungert, 
it  grows,  fire,"  lias  excited  much  interest  from  the  days  of  the  Greeks. 
The  name  —  impersonal  or  subjectless  propositions  —  which  has  been 
given  theiii  will  serve  to  explain  this.  .Vrislotlc.  the  father  and  oracle 
of  fornial  logic,  asserted,  upon  the  basis  of  an  analvsis  of  propositions, 
that  every  judgment  must  have  a  subject  and  a  predicate.  After  his 
day  attention  was  directed  to  the  impersonal  because  it  did  not  appear 
to  conform  to  the  rule  of  judgments.  Thus  arose  a  cnntroversv  which 
has  come  down  to  us. 

This  state  of  affairs  suggests  several  thoughts  :  (.\)  When  theories 
presuppose  and  destrov  one  another  there  is  a  necessity  of  looking  for 
some  j)resupposition  underlying  and  determining  the  various  points 
of  view.  (B)  An  historical  review  of  the  held  of  (ontruversv  is  also 
called  for.  Bv  means  of  it  we  shall  obtain  the  various  types  of  theory 
which  have  been  held,  together  with  their  relations  to  one  another  and 
to  the  presupposition.  (C)  The  way  will  then  be  left  open  for  an 
intelligent  and  thorough  criticism  of  former  investigations  and  a 
method  for  a  new  investigation  provided.  These  thoughts  indicate 
the  natural  divisions  into  which  our  subject  falls. 

A.  rRESE.VTATION  OF  THE  PRESUPPOSITION  UNDERLYING  PREVIOUS 

INVESTIGATIONS. 

The  presupposition  common  to  all  views,  with  the  exception  of 
one  or  two,  may  be  stated  in  a  few  words.  Investigators  have  accepted 
without  question  the  statement  that  impersonal  expressions  are  judg- 
ments. And  again  they  have  admitted  that  the  normal  judgment 
must  have  a  subject  and  a  predicate.  The  result  has  been  thai  the 
more  systematic  and  logical  minds  have  been  forced  to  seek  a  subject 
which  has  eluded  them  at  every  turn.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who 
have  had  facts  more  in  mind  than  theories  have  pointed  out  that  the 
various  subjects  brought  forward  have  been  formal  and  empty,  or  have 
been  gained  through  twisting  the  form  and  meaning  of  the  proposi- 
tion. It  is,  therefore,  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  controversy  has 
brought  the  problem  no  nearer  to  solution. 

3 


i55;^;o 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


But  we  shall  be  asked  on  what  basis  the  above  thorough-going 
assertion  has  been  made.  Proof  of  our  assertion  must,  therefore,  be 
brought  forward.     Several  reasons  may  be  given  : 

I.  Following  the  historical  development  several  conclusive  proofs 
with  reference  to  antiquity  present  themselves: 

I.  Aristotle  sfave  to  formal  loiJ^ic  tliat  systematic  form  which  it 
has  retained  almost  without  change  to  the  present  day.'  In  the 
hands  of  the  rhetoricians  it  was  made  the  instrument  of  argumenta- 
tion, and  was  regularly  taught  in  the  schools  established  in  the  towns 
and  cities.*  By  the  time  of  the  Middle  Ages,  formal  logic  had 
become  the  universal  method  of  investigation,  and  bv  its  use  the  doc- 
trines received  on  the  authority  of  the  church  were  elaborated  and 
defended.^  Although  beginnings  of  inductive  research  are  noticeable 
early  in  (ireek  thouglit,  it  was  not  until  the  dawn  of  the  modern  era 
that  they  were  set  on  an  independent  footing.  Toward  a  formulation 
of  inductive  inquiry  the  two  Bacons  did  much,  but  it  remained  for  our 
own  century  and  Stuart  Mill  to  make,  in  England,  a  systematic  pres- 
entation of  the  method.  And  even  yet  science  is  not  fully  conscious 
of  -.ts  own  inner  method  of  procedure.  These  facts,  which  are  now 
comuionplaces  in  the  philosophic  world,  make  it  evident  that  all 
ancient  criticism  proceeded  (and  necessarily  so)  upon  the  basis  of 
formal  logic.  This  thought  becomes  more  forceful  when  we  remember 
how  the  spirit  of  speculation  in  and  of  itself  died  out  after  Aristotle. 
Thought  turned  more  and  more  to  ethical  and  religious  questions. 
Logic  busied  itself  mainly  with  matters  of  detail,  until  in  the  skeptic 
movement  it  seemed  to  be  devoid  of  all  content  whatever.  In  the 
succeeding  period  authority  supplied  the  content,  but  formal  logic 
g?ve  the  method  for  the  manipulation  of  this  content  both  in  the  reli- 
gious and  secular  schools. 

Now  formal  logic  has  always  insisted  that  every  judgment  or  prop- 
osition must  have  both  a  subject  and  a  predicate.  Aristotle  first 
made  this  assertion  uj)()n  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  Greek  sentence. 
The  assertion  next  took  the  form  that  predication  necessarily  inyohed 
something  of  which  it  was  predicated,  /.  e.,  a  subject.  Further,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  impersonals  (with  the  exception  of  such  expressions 
as  xP'^j  which  proved  too  refractory  to  the  methods  of  reduction   then 

'See  rrantl,  Geschichte  der  Logik  im  Abendlande. 

^^  Hatch,   Ilibbert  Lectures,  1888,  pp.  25  ff. 

3  See  histories  of  philosophy  in  general ;  also  Prantl,  Gesch.  der  Logik. 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  5 

known)  were  genuine  judgments.  Hence  the  search  for  a  subject  was 
a  matter  of  pure  consistency. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  most  strenuouslv  opposed  the 
logicians  never  brought  the  general  doctrine  of  the  judgment  into 
question,  but  simplv  asserted  that  the  logicians  were  perverting  lan- 
guage in  their  attempts  to  find  a  subject.' 

2.  The  fact  which  directlv  proves  our  assertion  is,  that  in  both 
ancient  and  modern  times  (with  few  exceptions)  the  impersonal  has 
been  regarded  as  an  anoinalv."  It  indeed  seemed  to  l)e  a  freak  of 
thought,  and  all  endeavor  was  turned  toward  explaining  its  peculiar 
nature.  This  fact  is  so  evident  that  no  detailed  proof  is  necessary. 
From  the  time  of  Quintilian  until  the  present  day  the  impersonal  has 
remained  something  strange  and  uncouth.  The  long-sustained  con- 
troversv  stands  as  testimonv  to  the  fact  that  this  form  of  expression  is 
suflicientlv  individual  to  baffle  the  most  earnest  endeavors  to  bring  it 
consistently  under  the  general  form  of  mental  assertion. 

Putting  the  two  proofs  together  there  can  be  n^-  doubt  that  a  pre- 
supposition, such  as  we  have  described,  underlay  all  investigation  of 
the  impersonal  judgment  in  ancient  times. 

II.  \\  hen  we  come  to  modern  times  the  nature  of  the  presupposi- 
tion becomes  very  evident.  It  is  true  that  of  recent  years  logic  has 
begun  to  be  reconstructed  more  upon  a  psvchological  basis,  but  much 
of  ancient  tradition  still  remains,  and  this  shows  itself  ])articularlv  in 
regard  to  the  judgment.  Most  logicians  assert  with  confidence  that 
all  judgment  must  be  twofold,  must  have  a  subject  and  a  predicate, 
while  the  few  who  stand  for  a  new  inierpretation  are  regarded  as  quite 
erroneous.'  With  regard  to  the  treatment  of  impersonals  the  recog- 
nition of  the  presupposition  determining  investigation  is  quite  com- 
plete. P>dmann  says,^  "  In  all  of  them  (impersonal  judgments)  a 
cause,  be  it  ever  so  undetermined,  is  presented  ....  since  an  event 
without  a  substrat,  a  cpiality  without  a  subject,  is  altogether  unpresent- 
able." Kaindl,'*  although  .endeavoring  to  solve  the  problem  on  tra- 
ditional lines,  recognizes  very  clearlv  the  basis  on  which  most  of  the 
investigations  have  been  made.      His  words  are  worth  quoting  :     "The 

'  For  details  see  below,  pp.  8  ff.  ^Logik,  p.  304. 

'  For  details  see  below,  pp.  8  ff. 

*  Wesen  und  Hedeutun);?  der  Impersonalien,  p.  278.  Cf.  Schuppe,  Zeilschr.  fiir  V., 
Psy.  It.  Sprach'tviss.,  Hd.  16.  pp.  244  ff. ;  Venn,  Empirical  Logic,  p.  233;  .Steinthal, 
Zeilschr.fiir   \'.  Psy.  u.  .Sf>rach7viss.,  Bd.  4,  pp.  235-7. 


6  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

question  as  to  the  essence  and  meaning  of  inipersonals  is  old.  The 
ground  of  interest  lies  near  enough.  While,  according  to  grammar, 
each  proposition  must  have  a  subject  and  a  predicate,  and,  according 
to  logic,  of  a  subject,  a  predicate  notion  is  atfirmed  or  denied,  in  the 
expressions,  '  Es  donnert,'  '  Es  istmir  wohl,'  '  Es  ist  Tag,'  the  subject 
seems  to  be  lacking.  Now,  since  from  the  grammatical  standpoint  it 
could  not  be  denied  that  '  Es  donnert,'  etc.,  were  propositions,  from 
the  logical  point  of  view  they  had  to  be  considered  as  judgments. 
Thus  there  arose  a  contradiction  which  gave  rise  to  many  attempts  at 
explanation."  Kaindl  spoke  truly  when  he  remarked  that  contradic- 
tion seemed  to  be  the  only  outcome  of  previous  investigation.  This 
makes  it  all  the  more  evident  that  a  criticism  of  the  underlying  pre- 
supposition is  necessary  to  further  investigation  of  the  impersonal. 

B.     HISTORICAL    RESUME. 

The  various  theories  of  the  impersonal  may  be  classed  under  two 
general  heads  :  (I),  doctrines  which  emphasize  the  place  where  the  sub- 
ject is  to  be  sought ;  (II),  doctrines  which  are  characterized  by  the  kind 
of  subject  which  must  be  sought. 

1.  The  first  general  division  falls  into  several  minor  parts  ; 

I.  The  subject  is  sought  in  the  grammatical  form.  This  view  is 
peculiarly  characteristic  of  ancient  thought,  and  the  reason  is  not  far 
to  seek.  The  clear-cut  distinctions  which  moderns  make  between  the 
subjective  and  the  objective,  between  thought  and  expression,  or,  again, 
between  judgment  and  proposition,  are  a  late  acquisition.'  At  first  the 
mind  recognizes  no  distinction  between  them  and  interprets  botli  from 
the  objective  side.  Thus  Aristotle  derived  his  doctrine  of  the  judg- 
ment from  the  analysis  of  propositions.  The  logicians  who  followed 
hiui  were  rhetoricians  as  well  as  logicians,  and  for  a  great  length  of 
time  logic  and  rhetoric  were  inseparable.  Hence  the  early  form  of  the 
controversy  under  consideration  was  concerned  with  the  possibility  ot 
finding  a  subject  in  the  structure  of  the  proposition.  Three  types  of 
this  view  appear:  [a)  the  Greek,  (d)  the  Latin,  [c]  the  Italian. 

(a)  The  Greek  grammarians  thought  that  a  nominative  should  be 
supplied,  and  for  this  purpose  "Zeus"  seems  to  have  been  the  favorite 
—  Zeus  rained,  thundered,  snowed.  This  points  to  a  comparatively 
advanced  stage  in  thought,  a  stage  in  which  jxirticular  gods  (and  finally 
one  god)  were  supposed  to  be  the  causes  of  natural  changes  in  general, 

'  See  Burnett,  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  Introduction. 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  7 

and  especially  of  those  not  referable  to  some  known,  finite  cause.  These 
verbs  were  denominated  ^ela  p^fiara,'  on  account  of  their  reference  to 
the  deitv  as  the  cause  of  the  events  thev  indicated.  .\  number  of 
exceptions  (e.  .^,^,  Act,  xpv)  ^vere  found  to  this  rule.  In  these  Zeus  could 
not  verv  well  be  taken  as  the  subject.  'I'o  obviate  the  difficulty  such 
verbs  were  straightway  interpreted  as  adverbs,  and  tlic  Greek  logical 
conscience  seems  to  have  been  satisfied. 

{/>)  In  the  main  the  Roman  in\ estimators  expounded  and  defended 
the  position  of  the  Greek  grammarians  ;  in  all  tilings  literary  the  latter 
were  always  the  ins[)iration  of  the  former.  About  the  only  contribution 
made  by  the  Romans  was  in  seeking  the  subject  in  the  infinitive. 
Quintilian,'  who  set  Roman  rhetoric  upon  a  firm  basis,  remarked  upon 
the  difference  between  the  personal  and  the  impersonal  forms.  He 
perceived  a  difference  between  "panditur  interea  domus  oinnipotentis 
Olvmpi  "  and  ''totis  usque  adeo  turbatur  agris."  in  the  latter  a  start- 
ing point,  an  "  initiiiiii,"  is  lacking.  According  to  Priscian,^  he  who 
wishes  to  understand  tlic  impersonal  must  seek  a  subject  in  the  nomi- 
native of  the  activity  implied  in  the  verb.  For  example,  when  we  say 
"curritur"  we  mean  "cursus  curritur,"  also  "eventus  evenit,"  etc. 
That  is,  Priscian  accepts  the  position,  but  finds  the  subject  otherwise 
than  in  Zeus. 

The  opponents  of  those  who  sought  a  subject  in  the  grammatical 
structure  of  the  proposition  contented  themselves  with  pointing  out  that 
a  real  subject  was  lacking,  and  that  every  attempt  made  to  supply  such  a 
subject  had  vitiated  the  original  meaning.  Here  we  niav  cite  Maximus 
Planudes  and  .\ugustinus  Saturnius.  Planudes'*  said,  "There  are  cer- 
tain verbs  that  in  no  respect  signify  a  subject  or  a  person  (which 
indeed  we  are  also  want  to  call  impersonals),  having  the  appearance  or 
form  of  the  third  person,  but  belonging  to  none."  Saturnius,'  in  com- 
bating Priscian.  gave  the  key  to  the  ordinary  objection  in  ancient 
days:  "  The  gods  destroy  you,  Priscian.  with  this  doctrine  of  yours. 
In  the  first  place  you  annihilate  all  impersonals  with  passive  termina- 
tions ;  for  those  verbs  to  which  one  supplies  such  a  nominative  (/.  <'., 
nominative  of  the  activity  implied)  are  manifestly  of  this  sort.  Then, 
afterward  you  attribute  to  all  of  them  a  passive  meaning.  But  in 
truth  this,  your    principle,  if    it    be    true,   iinist    also    be    understood 

'  .\pollonius  (Egger),  p.  174.  ■•  Hachmann's  Anecdota  Gritca.  2  :  47. 

'Miklosich,  Subjectlose  Satze,  p.  7.  SSanctii  Minerva,  p.  305. 

'  I'riscian.  2  :  230.  2  :  231. 


8 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


throughout  the  whole  conjugation  of  the  verb.  And  so,  whatever 
nominative  is  understood  (or  the  nominative  of  a  verb  in  the  passive 
tense),  tliis  of  course  must  be  understood  throughout  all  the  remaining 
forms  of  its  declension.  Wherefore,  when  Tacitus  says  'procursum  est 
ab  hoste,'  here  I  beg  vou,  Priscian,  can  that  nominative  of  yours  be 
rightly  understood  for  verbs  of  the  perfect  tense?" 

(<r)  In  the  Italian  school  we  have  the  connecting  link  between  the 
ancient  and  modern  schools.  Rinaldo  Corso  approached  the  subject 
principally  from  the  objective,  grammatical  standpoint,  but  there  was 
in  him  also  a  tendency  to  view  the  matter  subjectively.  A  short  quo- 
tation will  give  his  view  succinctly:'  "That  verb  is  impersonal  with 
which  there  does  not  belong  some  person  first,  second,  or  third,  but 
which,  by  means  of  the  semblance  of  the  third  person,  indicates  some 
phenomenon  in  a  general  manner." 

All  these  theories  show  clearlv  that  great  difficulty  was  experienced 
by  ancient  and  mediaeval  logicians  and  grammarians  in  explaining 
impersonals.  So  long  as  thev  thought  simplv  of  the  grammatical 
structure,  the  most  natural  interpretation  was  that  the  impersonal  was 
really  subjectless.  As  logicians,  however,  thev  were  forced  to  search 
for  a  subject,  and  this  led  to  constructions  of  propositions  which  to 
the  ordinary,  non-logical  eye  were  fantastic  and  impossible.  The  tend- 
ency to  pass  from  the  proposition  to  the  judgment,  from  the  outer 
world  to  the  inner,  was  necessitated  by  these  contradictions,  and  was 
in  direct  agreement  with  the  movement  in  the  whole  world  of  thought 
at  the  time.  The  first  clear  application  of  this  to  the  impersonal  was 
made  by  the  Germans. 

2.  Having  searched  in  vain  for  a  subject  in  the  grammatical 
expression,  investigators  began  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  psycho- 
logical structure.  There  was  reason  for  this  movement.  As  we  have 
seen,  thought  had  at  first  an  objective  outlook.  But  gradually  the 
inner  life  differentiated  itself  from  the  outer  expression,  and  a 
study  of  it  for  itself  began  to  be  made.  This  movement  first 
made  itself  felt*  in  later  (jreek  life  and  philosophy,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  Christian  era  that  personality  and  the  inner  world  came 
clearly  to  consciousness.  Throughout  the  Christian  ages  the  human 
soul  was  the  great  center  of  interest.  However,  it  was  not  the  struc- 
ture of  the  soul  in  and  of  itself  which  was  interesting.     To  the  church 

'  In  Venetia,  1562,  8,  parte  quarla,  p.  365. 

^See  Windelband,  and  histories  of  philosophy  generally. 


THK    IMPKKSONAL    JUDGM KNT  9 

it  was  an  object  of  salvation.  Ilcnce,  altliough  Augustine  made  a 
close  analysis  of  the  inner  life,  tliis  analvsis  proceeded  upon  the  basis 
of  the  development  of  the  soul  through  Divine  Grace.  The  same  may 
be  said  of  the  mystic  movement.  It  was  not  until  the  time  of  the 
Nominalists  and  John  of  Salisbury  that  psychology  became  interesting 
in  and  of  itself.  Then,  indeed,  the  mind  which  had  served  a  long 
apprenticeship  in  the  formulation,  defense,  and  finally  in  the  attack  of 
the  dogma  of  the  schools,  became  aware  in  some  measure  that  it  had 
worth  itself.  When  once  the  inner  world  came  to  be  treated  (jn  a 
secular  and  scientific  basis,  the  world  of  thought  changed  entirely. 
Theories  of  knowledge  instead  of  theories  of  being,  induction  as 
opposed  to  deduction,  science  and  psychology,  began  to  force  them- 
selves to  the  front.  In  due  time  attention  was  turned  from  the  formal 
expression  of  thought  in  the  proposition  to  its  warm,  living  nature  in 
the  judgment. 

.\s  regards  the  impersonal,  the  development  of  comparative  philol- 
ogy not  only  aided  but  compelled  the  search  for  a  subject  in  the  proc- 
esses of  thought.  -Vt  first  there  was  some  wavering  and  uncertainty, 
but  in  the  end  philologists  were  forced  to  admit  that  the  subject  as 
ordinarily  sought  did  not  e.xist  at  all. 

Among  modern  philosophers  Herbart'  was  one  of  the  first  to  call 
attention  to  impersonal  expressions  and  to  recognize  the  la<k  of  a 
subject.  Vater,^'  the  philologist,  admitted  that  the  subject  is  completely 
unknown.  Sacy,^  being  unable  for  logical  reasons  to  conceive  a 
predicate  which  had  no  subject,  endeavored  to  meet  the  difficulty  by 
supposing  an  ellipse.  Miklosich,  who  did  the  first  thorough-going  work 
u])on  the  impersonal,  and  who  is  an  authority  upon  the  linguistic  side, 
criticized  most  destructively  the  objective  value  of  the  impersonal  •'  It." 
He  said:*  "The  division  of  propositions  into  subject  and  predicate  is 
not  founded  in  speech,  for  there  are  judgments  in  which  the  subject 
is  lacking.  In  the  proposition  'Pluit'  the  subject  is  not  oniv  unex- 
pressed, but  it  is  not  thought.  In  all  such  judgnients  an  event  is 
expressed  without  the  operating  subject  being  named.  It  is  thus  alto- 
gether incorrect  when  it  is  maintained  that  the  subject  of  such  a 
judgment  is  undetermined.      Further,  it   is  incorrect,  also,  when  the 

'  I.ehrbuch  zur  ICinlcitung  in  die  Philosophie,  pp.  1 04 -6. 
'  [.ehrbuch  der  allgemeiiien  Grammatik,  Ilalle  (1805),  p.  120. 
'Granimaire  Arabe,  2d  ed.,  1 83 1. 
*  Subjectlose  Satze.  pp.  2  ff. 


10  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

ground  of  tlie  peculiarity  of  such  judgments  is  sought  in  the  verb,  and 
the  verbs  are  divided  into  personal  and  impersonal.  Finally,  it  is  a 
mistake  when  the  subject  is  sought  in  the  pronoun  '  Es,'  which  in 
several  languages  accompanies  the  so-called  impersonals.  In  '  Es  ' 
no  living  subject  lies.  There  is  only  the  appearance  or  picture  of  it. 
When  the  subject  is  more  determined  we  mav  say  '  Zeus  pluit,'  but 
this  is  not  given  in  the'Es.'  The  impersonal  '  Es'  in  German  has 
no  equivalent  in  the  greater  number  of  languages.  .  .  .  The  subject  is 
a  contentless  form  word.  .  .  .  When  the  close  connection  between  the 
subjectless  proposition  and  the  neuter  gender  is  considered,  one  is  led 
to  the  thouglit  that  those  languages  in  which  the  neuter  is  lacking, 
because  thev  know  no  difference  in  gender,  should  have  no  subjectless 
propositions  at  all.  However,  the  Semitic  and  Romance  languages 
contradict  this.  .  .  .  Again,  what  are  we  to  say  when  we  perceive  this 
usage  in  the  Magvar,  in  which  the  difference  of  gender  is  unknown?" 

Now,  not  onlv  is  this  position  maintained  by  those  philologists 
who  sav  that  no  subject  can  be  found  in  the  grammatical  structure, 
but  the  contention  is  admitted  by  those  who  still  maintain  the  tradi- 
tional view  of  the  judgment.  To  prove  this  point  a  quotation  from 
Paul  is  all  that  is  necessary:' 

"  Our  assertion  that  two  members,  at  least,  go  to  make  up  a  sentence 
seems  to  be  contradicted  bv  the  fact  that  we  find  sentences  consisting 
of  only  a  single  word  or  of  a  group  forming  a  unity.  The  contra- 
diction is  explained  bv  the  fact  that  in  this  case  one  member  of  the 
sentence  is  taken  for  granted,  and  finds  no  expression  in  language. 

"  In  order  to  answer  the  question  concerning  the  impersonal  judg- 
ment properlv,  a  strict  division  must  be  made  between  the  gramma- 
tical form  and  the  logical  relation  denoted  therebv-  If  we  regard  the 
first  merely,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  sentences  like  '  Es  rauscht,' 
'  llgele.'  lowServian  'Vono  se  blyska'  (it  lightens),  have  a  subject.  But 
all  efforts  have  proven  fruitless  to  treat  this  '  Es,'  '  II,'  '  Vono,'  as 
a  logical  subject  and  to  give  it  a  definite  interpretation.  Again, 
in  sentences  like  the  Latin  '  Pluit,'  Greek  '  vei,'  Sanscrit  '  Varsati,' 
Lithuanian  '  Sninga,'  we  may  assume  that  the  formal  subject  is  not 
wanting.  For  such  subject  mav  be  contained  in  the  verbal  termina- 
tion under  which  a  i)ersonal  he,  she,  or  it  mav  be  understood.  It  cer- 
tainly may  be  said  for  the  opposite  view  that  in  the  languages  in  ques- 
tion the   third    ])erson    can   stand    also  bv    the  side  of  an  unexpressed 

'   Frinciples  of  Language,  pp.  ii6  ff. 


I 


THE    IMPEKSONAL    JUDGMENT  II 

subject  (JiipiitT  pliiit.  a  Ztis  Jti).  lUit  it  is  impossible  to  |)rove  that 
the  impersonal  did  not  arise  before  this  form  of  applying  it.  It 
seems  most  natural  in  this  case  to  recognize  a  formal  subject.  It  is 
with  the  i)ersonal  ending  just  as  it  is  with  the  dependent  pronoun. 
The  sentence  as  it  is  brought  into  the  normal  form  has  received  a 
formal  subject,  which  has  nothing  to  do  wiih  the  [isvchological.  Wc 
must  presup|)ose  an  older  stage  in  wliii  li  the  simjjle  verbal  stem  was 
set  down — a  stage  which  is  actuallv  seen  in  the  Hungarian  at  the 
present  day,  where  the  third  person  singular  has  no  suffix.  .\nd  we 
can  form  a  lively  idea  ot  this  stage  of  language  after  the  analogv  of 
the  sentences  just  discussed,  which  consist  of  a  single  (not  verbal) 
word.  These  are  really  and  truly,  so  far  as  linguistic  e.xpression  goes, 
subjectless." 

Thus  both  sides  seem  to  be  agreed  that  the  endeavor  to  find  a  real 
subject  in  the  grammatical  structure  must  be  abandoned  altogether. 
Some  investigators  (as  for  e.xample  Miklosich  and  Martv),  have  been 
led  bv  this  to  the  view  that  the  doctrine  of  the  judgment  must  be 
reconstructed.  The  necessitv  for  this  view  will  be  elaborated  later.  The 
majority  of  investigators,  however,  have  turned  to  the  psvchologi- 
cal  side  to  seek  a  subject.  This  tvpe  of  theorv  nuuntains  that  in  the 
impersonal  form  language  is  an  inadequate  representative  of  the  real 
thought,  and  that  a  subject  in  some  form  must  be  sought  in  the 
thought  process.  This  has  given  rise  to  a  great  variety  of  theories,  and 
any  discussion  must  depend  upon  a  classification  of  views  based  upon 
the  kind  of  subject  sought.  This,  however,  leads  us  to  our  second 
great  division  in  the  historical  review. 

II.  .\s  staled  above,  a  great  variety  of  theories  here  present  them- 
selves. In  classifving  these  I  have  proceeded  mainly  on  the  lines  laid 
down  bv  Martv."  In  this  classification  two  great  types  (with  manv  sub- 
divisions to  be  noted  later)   appear  : 

1.  The  subject  is  universal  or  undetermined. 

2.  It  is  individual  and  niore  or  less  determined. 

I.    In  the  view   of  investigators   of  this   tvi)e  the  sul)ject  to   which 
the  (juality,  activity,  or  event  is  referred  is  a   vague,  shadowy  beyond. 
This  mav  be  the  "Totality  of  e.xperience,"  the  "  .Ml  comprehending 
Realitv,"  the  "  Something  or  another,  we  know  not  what,"  or  other  sub 
ject  in  varving  degrees  of  indefiniteness.     These  forms  may  be: 

(</)   Indicated   in   the  verbal  stem.     These  have  been  treated  above 

'  I'ieritliiihrsihrift  fiir  -cisseuschaftliilie  Philosophie,  Bd.  8.  pp.  !;6  ff. 


12 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


under  the  classification  of  views  according  to  grammatical  structure, 
Priscian  was  the  main  representative  of  this  view,  but  with  him  must 
also  be  classed  Theoktist,  Sanctius,  and  Vossius. 

(^)  Indicated  in  some  other  wav. 

tt)  The  subject  is  something  or  another,  we  know  not  what.  The 
defenders  of  this  view  admit  that  the  grammatical  subject  is  purely 
formal,  but  maintain  tliat  it  is  unthinkable  that  there  should  be  pred- 
ication without  anv  subject  of  which  the  predication  is  made. 
This  subject,  however,  is  altogether  undetermined  and  unknown. 
Everv  attempt  to  determine  it  has  but  revealed  our  ignorance  of  the 
true  cause.  Thus  all  grades  of  determination  must  be  ruled  out. 
Upon  the  basis  of  a  mental  necessitv  we  recognize  the  presence  of  a 
subject  which  conditions  the  j)resent  appearance,  but  which  itself  is 
completelv  unknown  and  undetermined.  Two  eminent  representatives 
of  this  point  of  view  are  Wundt  and  Erdmann.  The  former,  speaking 
of  impersonal  expressions  savs  :  '  "Judgments  of  the  kind,  '  It  light- 
ens,' '  It  rains,'  have  been  regarded  as  subjectless  judgments.  The  name 
is  evidentlv  incorrect,  for  to  that  judgment  the  subject  is  bv  no 
means  wanting,  but  is  onlv  left  undetermined.  The  ignorance  of  the 
subject  to  which  a  predicate  is  attached  is  in  general  the  ground  of 
the  undetermined  judgment."  The  latter  treats  the  impersonal  as 
indicative  of  an  undetermined  cause  :  ^  "  We  must  first  cast  out  all 
judgments  in  which  there  is  a  reference  to  a  determined  logical  sub- 
ject. There  remain  as  pure  representatives  the  propositions  referring 
to  meteorological  phenomena,  e.  g.,  '  Es  regnet,'  '  Es  blitzt.'     .... 

In  them  the  subject  is  presented  as  undetermined In  all  such 

propositions  a  cause,  be  it  ever  so  undetermined,  is  presented  .... 
since  an  event  without  a  substrat,  a  qualitv  without  a  subject,  is  alto- 
gether unpresentable." 

/3)      It  has  been   said  that  Wundt   and   those   of  the  same  opinion 

treat  all  attempts  to  determine  the   subject  as   illusorv.      But  inasmuch 

as   such   attempts    have   been    made  tliev    must  be   noted.      Moreover, 

these     attempts    are    manifest     in     the     impersonal    judgment    itself. 

Erdmann  plainly  intimates  that   we   must   regard  as  impersonals,  only 

those  which  refer  to  meteorological  phenomena  and  are  causal  in  their 

significance,     lliis,  however,  is  an  arbitrary  procedure. 

■   Logik,  I,  p.  155.      (/.    M.  Jovanovich,  Die  Inipersonalien,  p.  45- 

^  Logik,    p.   304.    Cf.     Fr     Kern,     Die   deutsche    Satzlelire,    2.     Kap.;    Steinthal 

Zeitsclir.fiir  V.  Psy.  u.  Sprachwiss.,  Bd.  4,  p.  235;  Granmiatik,  l.ngik  uiul  Psychologie, 

pp.  92  ff. 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  I  3 

I'he  types  of  theory  which  fall  under  this  head  show  iiianv  grades 
of  determination.  The  subject  may  be  simplv  the  "  Totality  of  ex- 
perience," or  the  '•  All-comprehendinL,'  Reality."  But  this  experience, 
or  reality,  takes  now  one  form  and  now  another.  The  general  charac- 
teristic of  all  the  views  is  that  the  subject  is  vague  and  general,  but  the 
vagueness  and  generality  are  not  always  of  the  same  degree.  Here  we 
may  cjuote  Ueberweg'  as  especially  representative  of  this  kind  :  "'I'he 
subject  can  never  be  entirely  lacking  to  a  judgment  and  proposition. 
But,  indeed,  the  determined  subject  presentation  mav  fail,  and  the  bare 
'  Something  '  takes  its  place.  In  '  Es  (oder  Etwas)  ist  ein  Gott,' 
'  Es  giebt  ein  Ciott,'  the  undetermined  presented  Totality  of  Being, 
or  an  undetermined  part  of  the  same,  becomes  the  subject,  as  in  the 
propositions  '  Es  regnet '  '  Es  schneit.'  " 

2.  In  this  second  division  the  subject  of  the  impersonal  appears 
as  individual  and  determined.  Here  we  have  several  views.  On  the 
one  hand  we  have  the  view  represented  by  Bradlev  and  Bosanquet,  on 
the  other  the  view  of  Sigwart. 

Bradlev  and  Bosanquet  waver  between  regarding  the  subject  as  a 
vague  bevond,  to  which  reference  is  made,  and  the  mere  sense  impres- 
sion. To  them  the  subject  is  individual  in  the  sense  of  pertaining  to 
sense  ex|)erience,  but  nevertheless  it  transcends  the  sense  impression. 
Thev  thus  form  the  connecting  link  between  those  to  whom  the  sub- 
ject is  undetermined  and  general  and  those  who  conceive  it  as  some- 
thing so  particular  and  determined  as  the  mere  sense  impression. 
Bradlev  savs:'  "In  "Wolf'  or  'Rain'  the  subject  is  the  unspecified 
present  environment,  and  that  is  qualified  bv  the  attribution  of  the 
ideal  content  '  Wolf  or  'Rain.'  It  is  the  fx/c-r//a/  present  that  is  here 
the  subject.  But  in  some  moment  of  both  outward  sijualor  and  inward 
wretchedness,  where  we  turn  to  one  another  with  the  one  word  'miser- 
able," the  subject  is  here  the  whole  given  realitv." 

Sigwart  is  more  definite  in  his  view.  I-'or  him  the  subject  must  not 
be  confused  with  anv  internal  object.  It  is  found  in  the  sense  impres- 
sion. That  is,  in  the  judgment,  so-called,  a  sense  impression  of  varving 
content  is  recognized  by  means  of  a  familiar  idea.      I5ut  we  shall   let 

'System  tier  l,oi»ik.  ?.  .\iiH.,  pp.  162  ff.  C/.  l.otze,  l.ojs'ic,  Vnl.  i,  J?*^  47-Q  ;  rraiill. 
Refnrm-Gedanken  zur  Lowjik,  Fhil.-Hist.  CI.  .Akad.  zu  Miinclien.  p.  1S7;  Schleier- 
macher,  Dialektik,  §  304. 

'Logic,  p.  56.  C/.  B()san<|uet,  Loiric,  Vol.  I,  p.  ioq;  also  Essentials  of  Loi;ic, 
p.  bi  ■;. 


M 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


him  speak  for  himself:'  "Real  impersonals  are  those  in  which  the 
thought  of  the  thing  to  the  predicate  would  applv  is  entirely  wanting, 
in  which  we  cannot  even  ask  what  the  thing  is.  ^Vhen  we  sav  in  Ger- 
man '  mich  hungert.'  'mich  diirstet,'  there  is  no  room  for  the  ques- 
tion, 'Was  hungert  iiiich?'  any  more  than  a  substantive  can  be  a 
subject  to  '  pudet'  or  '  poenitet.'  W'iien  real  impersonal  propositions 
serve  to  express  something  which  is  accessible  to  immediate  outer  per- 
ception,— '  Es  donnert,'  '  Es  blitzt,' — then  we  start  from  a  simple  sense 
impression,  to  which  neither  perception  itself  nor  memory  supplies  a  sub- 
ject. When,  for  instance,  I  see  a  rocket  rise  or  hear  a  carriage  rattle 
over  the  pavement,  the  action  immediately  added  to  the  sound  or 
sight  which  was  given  alone  is  naming — the  unification 'of  the  present 
impression  with  a  familiar  idea.  .  .  .  The  reference  to  a  subject  which 
is  contained  in  the  pronoun  of  modern  languages  is  then  an  eniptv, 
customary  form.  These  judgments,  however,  are  without  a  subject 
only  in  the  narrower  sense  that  a  subject  thing  is  wanting.  Thev  are 
no  exception  to  the  general  nature  of  the  proposition  which  expresses 
a  judgment.  They  contain  the  synthesis  of  a  known  general  idea  with 
a  present  phenomenon,  and  it  is  this  phenomenon  which  is  the  subject 
and  which  is  indicated  by  the  personal  ending  with  its  original 
demonstrative  significance." 

Turning  from  these  types  of  theory  we  come  upon  another  form, 
essentially  different  : 

3.  From  earliest  times  there  has  been  opposition  to  the  view  that  a 
subject  could  be  found  for  the  impersonal  judgment.  We  have  seen 
that  when  the  search  was  confined  to  language,  there  was  a  feeling  that 
a  subject  could  be  made  out  onlv  bv  twisting  the  meaning  of  the}irop- 
osition.  The  early  critics  showed  pretty  clearly  that  too  inanv  absurdi- 
ties would  be  involved  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  the  impersonal  to  the 
normal  type.  However,  when  comparative  philology  arose,  the  battle 
was  finally  decided  in  favor  of  those  who  maintained  that  the  imper- 
sonal was  subjectless.  Our  quotations  from  authorities  on  philolog- 
ical questions  who  represent  opposite  views  on  the  logical  jjroblem 
have  shown  that  the  grammatical  subject  is  empty  and  valueless. 

'I'hen    came    the    position   of    those   who   sought  a  subject  in   the 

'  Logic,  Vol.  I,  p.  62.  C/.  Impersonalicn  ;  T.  Ziegler,  /^/li/.  Monatshefte,  Bd. 
— ,  pp.  42-7;  Schuppe,  Zcitsc/ir,  fiir  ]'.  J'sy.  ti.  S/>rac/i7C'/ss.,  Bd.  2,  pp.  244-9";  R.  F. 
Kaindl,  Wesen  u.  Bedeutung  der  Impersonalien,  /%//.  Moiiat.,  Bd.  28,  pp.  278-305  ; 
J.  Venn,  Mind,  Vol.  XlII,  p.  413;  Empirical  Logic,  p.  233. 


Tin:    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  I  5 

psychical  processes.  The  historical  review  has  shown  that  the  theories 
appearing  from  this  point  of  view  luav  be  reduced  to  two  great  types. 
In  one  the  subject  is  universal  and  undetermined;  in  the  other  it  is 
individual  and  determinetl.  rmkr  ilitsc  two  great  types  maybe  sub- 
sumed views  representing  every  grade  of  determination  ;  so  that  we 
have  a  series  running  from  tlie  clearly  determined  and  j)articular 
impression  up  to  the  universal  am!  indeterminate  "Totality  of  Heing," 
the  ".-Mi-comprehending  Reality,"  or  the  completely  unknown  condi- 
tion of  the  event. 

These  views  would  seem  to  exhaust  the  possibilities  as  regards 
the  impersonal  on  the  basis  of  the  ordinary  presujjposition.  For  if  a 
subject  is  to  be  sought, -it  must  be  found  either  in  the  outward  lin- 
guistic expression  or  in  the  inner  thought.  If  language  fails,  then  our 
only  resource  is  thought.  Hut  if  it  be  sought  in  ihnught,  the  subject  must 
either  be  particular  and  completely  determined,  universal  and  undeter- 
mined, or  it  must  lie  somewhere  between  these  two  limits. 

Now  we  have  seen  that  the  search  for  a  subject  of  whatever  kind 
has  resulted  in  nothing  lasting.  After  all  the  criticism  of  the  ages  the 
j)rol)lem  seems  to  be  as  vexed  as  ever.  This  has  been  the  reason  why  a 
new  investigation  on  somewhat  different  lines  seemed  to  be  in  order. 
The  point  of  view  represented  by  our  criticism  is  that  first  indicated 
by  Miklosich.'  It  is  to  the  exposition  of  his  theory  that  the  present 
section  is  directed. 

It  seemed  clear  to  him  that  every  subject  which  had  been  brought 
forward  was  untrue,  and  vet  it  was  equally  clear  that  the  admission 
that  all  judgment  is  twofold  drove  logically  to  a  quest  for  a  subject. 
He  escaped  the  dilemma  by  attacking  the  presup]iosition  which  lay 
at  the  basis  of  all  previous  investigation.  Mis  criticism,  however,  sim- 
ply indicated  that  the  ordinary  view  of  the  judgnient  must  be  remod- 
eled. The  full  justification  of  this  criticism  remains  as  something  yet 
to  be  accomplished. 

If  we  admit  that  the  results  of  previous  investigations  have  been  suf- 
ficiently paradoxical  to  warrant  a  new  investigation,  several  courses 
may  be  jmrsued  :  (</ )  We  may  refuse  to  admit  that  impersonal 
expressions  are  judgments,  and  maintain  that  search  for  either  subject 
or  predicate  is  futile.  (/')  We  may  deny  that  predication  necessarily 
involves  something  of  which  predi(  ation   is  made.     (<)  We  may  (]ues- 

^Of>.cit.  Cf.  Marty.  \'ierteljahrs<hrift  fur  -wissiuscfia/t.  Phil.,  Hil.  }<,  pp.  5b  ff.; 
Bd.  18,  pp.  320  ff.;   Hii.  10,  p().  10  ff. 


i6 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


tion  the  validity  of  the  presuj)position  and   pass  to  a  direct  analysis  of 
the  experiences  denominated  impersonal. 

The  first  assertion  could  be  made  only  on  the  basis  of  a  psvcho- 
Ibgical  analysis  of  the  impersonal,  and  this  has  still  to  be  made. 

We  must,  therefore,  turn  to  the  second  point.  Can  we  say  that  the 
impersonal  judgment  presents  us  with  a  predicate  for  which  no  subject 
need  be  sought?  Is  predication  the  fundamexital  form  of  judgment? 
Trendelenburg'  was  of  this  opinion.  However,  this  cannot  be  held 
consistently,  for  ])redication  which  is  predication  of  nothing  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms.  'I'o  predicate  is  to  refer  a  cpiality ;  to  refer  a 
quality  is  to  refer  it  to  something.  The  statement  that  every  predicate 
implies  a  subject  is  siin]ily  to  say  that  predication  is  made.  The 
judgment  is  analytical,  and  simply  asserts  an  identity.  The  same  may 
be  said  of  quality  and  thing,  of  event  and  cause.  Unless  a  quality  is 
the  quality  of  something,  it  is  no  quality  at  all.  An  event  which  has 
not  been  produced  is  self-contradictory.  In  all  these  cases  the  state- 
ment of  the  nature  of  the  activity  involved  in  the  processes  includes 
a  reference  to  a  correlate  which  cannot  be  separated  from  them.  Erd- 
mann'  was  correct  when  he  said  that  a  "quality  without  a  substrat,  an 
event  without  a  cause,  a  predicate  without  a  subject,  was  altogether 
unthinkable." 

Thus,  if  we  admit  that  the  impersonal  is  a  judgment  and  that  all 
judgment  is  discursive  or  twofold,  we  must  seek  a  subject,  no  matter 
how  difficult  the  task  may  be. 

This  brings  us  to  our  third  point.  It  still  remains  to  us  to  ques- 
tion the  assertion  that  all  judgment  is  discursive.  It  may  be  that  the 
full  nature  of  judgment  cannot  be  expressed  in  the  discursive  form. 

The  opinion  that  all  judgment  is  twofold  is  very  ancient.  It  goes 
back  to  the  time  of  Aristotle  and  has  behind  it  the  authority  of  that 
great  name,  together  with  all  the  authority  with  which  logical  tradition 
andusage  since  then  have  invested  it.  To  question  such  a  generalization 
would  seem  to  be  exceedingly  presumptuous.  However,  generaliza- 
tions of  whatever  kind  have  their  justification  and  sacredness  only  in 
the  function  which  they  serve.  They  are  hypotheses  or  points  of 
view,  by  means  of  which  we  organize  different  groups  of  experience. 
So  long  as  they  enable  us  to  control  experience  they  maintain  them- 
selves.    But  so  soon  as  they  fail  in  their  function  they  must  be  set  aside. 

'  Logisclie  Untersuchungen,  II,  pp.  205-15. 
^  Loc.  cit.,  p.  19. 


THE    IMI'KKSONAI.    JUDCMKNT  1 7 

This  may  occur  in  two  wavs.  It  iiiav  l)e  found  tliat  our  first  hypothe- 
sis was  incorrect,  and  we,  in  that  case,  replace  it  hv  some  other,  or  the 
hypothesis  may  explain  a  certain  group  of  facts.  Iml  \k-  fi)und 
inadecjuate  to  others  of  the  same  order.  In  sucli  a  case  the  old  hypoth- 
esis is  subsumed  under  a  fuller  generalization.  This  would  seem  to 
be  the  case  with  the  ordinary  theory  of  the  judgment.  There  can  be 
no  doubt,  both  that  the  discursiye  form  of  judgment  organizes  many 
of  the  facts  of  judgment,  and  that  there  are  certain  forms  of  judgment 
in  which  the  theory  has  signally  failed.  It  may  turn  out  that  the  imper- 
sonal is  no  judgment  at  all.  Hut  howeyer  this  may  be,  for  purposes 
of  investigation,  we  must,  for  the  time  being,  set  aside  our  yiew  of  the 
discursive  as  universal  and  examine  the  types  for  themselves.  To  do 
otherwise  and  to  insist,  as  has  been  done,  that  all  judgment  must  be 
discursive  is  to  be  utterly  unscientific. 

We  have  thus  cleared  the  way  for  a  new  investigation  of  the  imper- 
sonal;  we  must  now  endeavor  to  understand  the  impersonal  on  its  own 
basis  without  reference  to  the  criterion  of  the  di'scursive  judgment. 

Before  proceeding  with  our  analysis,  it  is  necessary  to  present  types, 
not  of  the  various  theories  of  the  impersonal,  but  ty))es  of  the  imper- 
sonal itself. 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  controversy  whether  certain 
expressions  are  really  impersonal.  The  fullest  and  most  careful  collection 
which  has  been  made  so  far  is  that  of  Miklosich  :  for  this  reason  I  have 
made  liberal  use  of  his  material,  but  shall  feel  tree  to  interpret  it  as 
facts  may  require. 

Miklosich  divides  impersonal  judgments  into  four  kinds:  (I),  sub- 
jectless  propositions  with  an  active;  (II),  subjectless  pro|)Ositions  with 
a  reflexive  verb;  (III),  subjectless  propositions  with  a  passive  verb;  (I\  ), 
subjectless  propositions  with  a  noun  and  a  verb  to  be. 

I.  Under  the  general  head  of  impersonals  with  active  verbs  may  be 
distinguished  : 

I.  Judgments  which  express  the  existence  of  an  object  ;  r.  ,j,^. .• 
"  Es  giebt  einen  Gott;  Es  ist  ein  Gott;  Es  wareinmil  ein  Kcinig;  Es  hat 
grosse  R;lume;  Es  hat  an  dem  (^rte  schone  I'ferde;  II  y  a  deux  ans  que 
mon  pdre  est  mort;Es  hat  keinen  geringen  Schrecken  gesetzt;  Es  setzt 
wunderliche  Reden  ab;  Es  giebt  etwas." 

If  we  take  expressions  of  the  type  of  the  first  two,  we  see  at  once 
that  they  may  mean  one  of  two  things.  Either  "  Es  giebt  einen  Gott" 
and  "  P2s  ist   ein   Ciott"  ujean  "Gott  ist,"  or   the  expressions  must  be 


1 8  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

taken  absolutely  and  to  express  simply  the  recognition  of  that  existence 
which  has  been  termed  (iod.  As  ordinarily  used,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  first  interpretation  is  correct.  In  such  a  case  the  sub- 
ject "Es"  is  purely  formal,  the  true  expression  being  "Gott  ist." 
Here,  then,  we  have  to  do  with  a  disguised  personal  proposition. 

But  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  expression  may  be  used  absolutely. 
It  may  point  to  the  experience  which  we  might  call  "God 
intoxicated,"  in  wliich  the  individual  mind  is  so  filled  with  the  thought 
of  God  and  feels  it  so  deeply  emotionallv  that  there  is  no  reference  to 
existence,  no  discursive  statement,  butsimj)lv  the  inner,  living  recogni- 
tion of  experience  itself,  in  the  full,  swelling  expression  "God."  I 
suppose  that  in  the  prophetic  state  the  feeling  of  unitv  with  the  Infi- 
nite (whether  the  experience  be  true  or  not)  has  been  so  intimate  that 
the  experience  of  the  individual  was  at  the  same  time  (and  immediately) 
the  presence  and  life  of  (lod.  In  such  experiences  assertions  are 
most  certainlv  made,  but  thev  are  assertions  in  which  the  parts  are 
taken  up  into  a  life  immediately  felt  and  lived. 

Of  "  Es  war  einmal  ein  Konig  "  the  proper  rendering  most  evidently 
is  "ein  Konig  war  einmal."  The  impersonal  "  Es  "  disappears 
altogether,  showing  that  it  was  })urelv  formal.  Of  "  Es  hat  grosse 
Biiume"  there  mav  be  two  interpretations,  ^^'e  may  suppose  that  the 
expression  means  that  in  some  definite  place  (indicated  perhaps  by 
the  pointing  of  the  finger)  great  trees  grow.  In  that  case  the  "Es"  is 
formal  once  more,  for  it  serves  merelv  as  a  svmbol  to  indicate  a  subject 
known  and  definite,  but  which  need  not  be  further  indicated,  inas- 
much as  the  center  of  interest  is  the  great  trees.  This  serves  to  indi- 
cate another  interpretation.  If  our  interest  centers  round  the  trees,  the 
expression  most  properly  becomes  "great  trees!"  Here  the  exclama- 
tion points  solely  to  the  recognition  of  that  experience  which  we  call 
"great  trees."  The  light,  as  it  were,  bursts  upon  us,  and  as  the 
phenomena  conie  into  view,  the  expression  of  immediate  recognition  is 
forced  from  us. 

"  F^s  hat  an  dem  Orte  schone  Pferde  ;  II  v  a  deux  ans  que  mon  pere  est 
mort;  Es  hat  keinen  geringen  Schrecken  gesetzt;  Es  hat  setzt  wunder- 
liche  Reden  ab,"  mav  be  converted  simplv.  Again  the  impersonal 
disappears,  giving  way  to  the  perfectly  definite  subject. 

"  Es  giebt  Etwas"  may  be  interpreted  either  as  "Etwasgiebt"  or 
simplv  as  "  Etwas."  If  we  follow  the  interpretation  "Etwas  giebt,"  the 
proposition   becomes  existential   in   nature,  and   the  assertion  is  made 


THE    IMl'EKSONAL    JUDGMENT  IQ 

that  something  vugue,  indefinite,  general,  exists.  Hut  this  interpreta- 
tion seems  to  me  somewliat  forced,  and  fails  to  catcli  the  shade  of 
meaning  which  "  Ks  giebt  Etwas"  endeavors  to  convey.  I'he  meaning 
is  more  e.xactly  rendered  by  "Etwas"  alone.  The  quiclc,  half-startled 
exclamation  denotes  the  recognition  in  an  immediate  way  of  some  dis- 
turbing occurrence  or  object. 

A  review  of  these  types  of  impersonals  makes  it  clear  that  (</)  the 
impersonal  subject  is  purely  forujal,  the  true  subject  being  brought  out 
by  simple  conversion  ;  [fi)  the  "  Es"  has  more  than  a  svmbolic  value  and 
indicates  a  vague,  shadowy  subject,  of  which  some  assertion  is  made. 
It  indicates,  as  it  were,  the  first  beginnings  of  differentiation  within  a 
recognized  content,  the  bare  a[)pearance  of  the  discursive  form.  (<)  In 
most  cases  the  expression  is  more  trulv  turned  in  the  form"Gott," 
"Ein  Konig." '"Etwas."  These  indicate  the  immediate  recognition  or 
assertion  of  an  experience,  object,  or  event,  in  wiiich  no  definite  subject 
or  predicate  is  discursivelv  asserted. 

2.  The  impersonal  propositions  which  implicate  phenomena  of 
nature  have  been  found  to  be,  perhaps,  the  most  interesting  of  all.  But 
when  we  seek  to  analvze  the  experiences  simplv  for  themselves,  they 
become  very  simple  indeed.  The  remarks  which  have  been  made 
concerning  the  first  class  apply  here  very  evidently. 

If  we  take  the  expressions,  "  Es  weht,"  "  fc^s  weht  einen  ungestiimen 
Wind,"  the  interpretation  may  be  twofold.  The  "  Es"  may  be  purely 
symbolic  and  may  conceal  a  subject  perfectly  well  known.  That  this 
is  so  mav  be  seen  bv  converting  the  second  sentence.  It  becomes 
"  Ein  ungestiimer  Wind  weht."  It  is  evident  that  we  have  had  in  mind 
all  along  the  expression  "Wind  "  as  subject.  But,  again,  "  Es  weht  "  may 
be  and  is  more  i)roj)erlv  rendered  by  the  expression  "Weht."  So  also 
with  "Es  blitzt,  donnert,  friert,"  etc.  Or  again  we  may  use  the 
participle  "Wehend,"  or  "Blitzend."  Sigwart  himself '  asserts  that  the 
impersonal  expression  may  be  turned  as  truly  by  the  participles  as  by 
the  ordinarv  form. 

The  English  equivalents,  "'  It  rains,"  "It  snows,"  "It  thunders," 
present  the  same  experience.  W  c  most  truly  express  what  we  mean 
in  these  cases  when  we  sim|)ly  ejaculate  "raining."  "rain,"  "thundering," 
"lightning."  For  example,  after  being  indoors  for  the  greater  part  of 
the  dav,  without  noticing  the  weather,  how  often  in  stepping  outside  we 
suddenlv  exclaim  "  rain,"  "snow,"  "lightning,"  as  the  state  of  things 

'  Loc.  lit.,  p.  I(). 


20  TIIK    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

presents  itself  to  us.  The  one  thing  in  our  minds  has  been  the 
simple  recognition  of  the  rain,  the  thunder,  or  the  lightning.  Or, 
again,  when  the  fire-bell  rings,  often  the  only  thing  in  our  conscious- 
ness is  the  immediate,  clear  recognition  of  the  situation  expressed  by 
the  exclamation  "  Fire  I" 

To  conclude,  these  expressions  in  their  essential  nature  present  us 
with  tlie  immediate  recognition  of  a  situation  or  an  ex{:)erience  on  its 
intellectual  or  on  its  active  side.  The  simjjle  content  or  activity 
recognized  immediately  and  standing  for  itself  fills  our  consciousness 
for  the  time  being.  It  is  present  in  the  mind  as  an  experience  taken 
as  a  total itv  and  recognized  in  and  through  itself. 

(3)  In  previous  examples  the  illustrations  presented  us  with 
experiences  recognized  on  their  intellectual  or  on  their  active  sides.  The 
expressions  implicating  states  of  the  soul  or  body  give  us  illustrations 
of  experiences  recognized  on  the  side  of  feeling.  Such  expressions 
are  "  Mich  diirstet,  hungert,  schliifert."  These  may  be  rendered 
"  Ich  bin  diirstig,  hungrig,  schliifrig,"  so  that  the  subject  becomes 
"  Ich,"  and  the  impersonal  form  disappears  altogether.  This  is,  of 
course,  a  possible  and  verv  common  interpretation.  But  verv  fre- 
quently the  feeling  of  thirst,  hunger,  sleep,  is  so  pronjinent  that 
it  is  the  only  thing  in  the  mind  at  the  time.  In  such  cases  the 
experience  is  most  properly  expressed  in  the  terms  "  hungrig," 
"  schlafrig,"  "diirstig."  Here  the  mind  is  filled  with  an  experience 
recognized  in  and  through  itself,  and  in  which  the  state  of  feeling 
clearly  predominates. 

In  such  cases  as  these  the  utter  lack  of  a  subject  in  any  form 
answering  to  the  question  "Was  hungert  mich?"  etc.,  is  apparent.  As 
Sigwart  says,  "  The  moment  we  ask  such  a  question  it  seems  utterly 
absurd  and  inappropriate." 

(4)  When  we  turn  to  the  judgments  which  express  modifications 
of  the  senses,  the  truth  of  our  assertion  that  the  greater  number  of 
impersonals  express  an  experience  recognized  immediately  and  as  a 
totality  is  evident.  In  such  expressions  as  "  Es  nuirmclt,"  "  Es 
saust,"  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  sense  experience  itself  is  most 
prominent  in  the  mind.  That  the  "Es"  is  purely  formal  and  con- 
tentless  may  be  easily  seen,  if  we  remember  our  state  of  consciousness 
when  our  fingers  have  been  burnt.  Someone  seeing  us  start  suddenly 
inquired  for  the  reason  of  the  start.  The  expression  "burned"  which 
has  so  often  escaped  us  showed  that  the  recognition  of  our  state  of  feel- 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  2  1 

ingwas,  from  the  intellectual  side,  the  one  thini^  in  our  minds.  We  may 
illustrate,  again,  by  another  customary  expression  :  When  we  find  that 
a  metal  or  liquid  which  has  appeared  cool  is  very  hot,  we  draw  back  the 
hand.  The  thought  that  flashes  into  our  minds  is,  ••  Hot.  "  We  do  not 
understand  any  "'It,"  or  "Something  or  another,"  nor  even  "'Ihe 
iron."  Our  one  thought  is  given  exactly  in  the  expression  "  Hot."  We 
should  compare  with  this  the  childish  e.xj)ression  "  Burnie."  I  have 
noticed  children  muriuur  this  e.xpression  to  themselves  when  their 
eves  fell  on  something  which  at  some  time  had  been  the  occasion  of  a 
severe  burning.  To  them  the  sense  im|)ression  was  not  a  sense 
impression  as  the  psychologist  understands  it,  but  an  immediately 
recognized  content. 

(5)  The  judgments  which  express  a  lack  or  a  contradiction  are  not 
really  impersonals.  As  noted  in  several  cases  already,  the  impersonal 
"  Es"  is  formal  and  conceals  the  real  subject.  "  Es  mangelt  an  (ield," 
and  "  Ich  muss  schauen  woran  es  fehlt,"  when  converted,  present  sub- 
jects which  are  quite 'definite.  The  "Es"  in  "  Es  fehlt,"  which  at 
first  sight  might  seem  to  be  indefinite,  is  not  really  so.  The  legitimate 
inference  is  that  the  subject  of  conversation  requires  an  exj)osition 
which  can  be  easily  given.  For  example,  what  we  really  mean  is, 
"  Geld  mangelt,"  etc. 

(6)  Those  judgments  which  express  mystery  admit  of  easy 
interpretation.  "  Es  spukt "  is  evidently  similar  to  our  expression 
"  Spooks  "  and  indicates  the  immediate  interpretation  of  an  experi- 
ence as  ghostly. 

In  "  Es  wandelt  um,"  and  "  Es  geht  irre  im  Haus,"  the  case  is 
otherwise.  In  both  there  is  a  distinct  reference  to  a  "  Something  or 
another,  we  know  not  what."  something  undefined  and  vague  is  wan- 
dering about,  or  something  is  wrong  in  the  house.  Hence  these 
expressions  are  quite  different  from  the  following: 

(7)  "  Es  geht  mit  dieser  Sache  wie  mil  der  andern."  "  Es  geht 
ihm  um  den  Kopf."  In  the  first  the  subject  evidently  is  "  Diese 
Sache,"  as  may  be  seen  by  converting  the  jiroposition.  In  the  second, 
"  Es  "  refers  to  some  definite  thing  [e.  .^.,  a  band)  which  encircles  the 
head. 

1 1.  U'e  turn  now  to  the  second  great  class  of  irnpersonals,  viz..  sub- 
jectless  propositions  with  a  reflexive  verb. 

In  such  expressions  as  "  Es  setzt  hier  schlecht,"  "  Des  Morgens  geht 
sich'sgut."  "  II  fait  bon  marcher  le  matin,""  Es  giebt  sich  leicht,wenn 


22  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

man  reich  ist,"  a  perfectly  definite  subject  may  be  gained  bv  convert- 
ing the  sentences.  Tliis  point  comes  out  very  clearly  when  the  Eng- 
lish equivalents  are  given.  We  say,  "  That  (the  affair)  has  been  poorly 
arranged,"  "Affairs  go  well  in  the  morning,"  "The  walking  is  good 
this  morning,"  "  Living  is  easy  when  one  is  rich."  Such  impersonals 
belong,  therefore,  to  the  class  which  are  impersonal  only  in  form,  and  in 
which  the  formal  conceals  the  true  subject. 

III.  The  impersonals  with  a  passive  verb  may,  for  the  most  part, 
be  disposed  of  by  conversion.  If  we  take  the  expressions  "  Es  wird 
gegangen,  gelacht,  geliebt, "  "Gott  sei's  gedankt,  "  "  Stets  gegrundet, 
stets  geforscht  und  stets  gegrundet,"  by  throwing  them  into  the 
active  form,  the  subject  (be  it  the  event,  person,  object,  God)  becomes 
at  once  definite  and  concrete. 

IV.  Turning  to  the  last  class  of  impersonals — subjectless  propo- 
sitions with  a  name  and  the  verb  to  be — we  find  that  they  can  be 
reduced  with  ease  to  the  several  forms  already  distinguished. 

In  such  expressions  as  "  Es  ist  kalt,"  "  Es  ist  dunkel,"  the  meaning 
maybe  expressed  by  "  Der  Abend,  der  Tag  ist  kalt,  dunkel."  In  this 
case  the  subject  is  definite.  Again,  the  meaning  may  be  indicative  of 
the  recognition  of  the  state  of  affairs  as  one  steps  outside.  In  such 
cases  the  expression  should  be  "  Kalt !  "  "Dunkel  I  "' 

Of  the  expressions  "  Es  wird  Abend,  Morgen,"  "  Es  sommert, 
wintert,"  there  may  be  several  interpretations. 

We  may  simply  convert  the  sentence,  as  with  the  first  expressions, 
and  so  gain  a  definite  subject  which,  until  conversion,  had  been  con- 
cealed by  the  symbolic  form.  Or  the  "  Es  "  may  be  taken  to  indicate 
something,  we  know  not  what,  which  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
phenomena  ;  or  finally  the  expressions  may  be  taken  absolutely,  the 
meaning  being  conveyed  in  the  immediate  recognition  of  the  event 
expressed  by  the  exclamation  "Abend  !  "  "Sommert  I  " 

Our  review  af  the  various  forms  of  impersonals  is  thus  complete. 
And  unless  our  analysis  has  been  incorrect,  our  result  may  be  summed 
up  in  the  following : 

The  formal  subject  may  be  interpreted  in  several  ways  : 

1.  It  is  purely  formal  and  may  be  displaced  bv  conversion. 

2.  The  "  Es,"  "  It,"  or  their  equivalents,  have  more  than  a  formal 
value.     They  indicate  a  vague,  shadowy,  undifferentiated  subject. 

3.  In  by  far  the  greater  number  of  cases  the  expressions  show 
no  discursive  reference  of  a  predicate  to  a  subject.     The  true  meaning 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  23 

is  indicated  in  tlie  expression  of  an  experience  iinniediately  recot;- 
nized.  This  experience  niav  represent  anv  one  of  the  three  aspects  of 
life,  /.  f.,  it  niav  be  tlie  recotrnition  of  an  event,  of  a  content,  or  of  an 
affective  experience. 

Here  we  inav  remind  ourselves  of  certain  remarks  made  by  Wundt 
and  Sigwart  in  their  consideration  of  the  iiiij)ersonal.  \\  uiitlt  says:' 
''  All  impersonal  propositions  are  not  undetermined  judi^ments,  but 
frecpientlv  a  determined  presentation  conceals  itself  behind  the  appar- 
ent undetermined  demonstrative  pronoun.  We  do  not  say,  '  It 
is  John'  in  the  same  wav  in  which  we  sav,  '  It  rains.'  The  former 
is  no  longer  undetermined."  To  this  we  shall  add  Sigwart's  words-  as 
explanatorv  of  the  difference  between  the  true  and  the  apjiarent 
impersonal:  "When  I  sav,  '  It  is  beginning,'  'There  it  goes,'  '  It  is 
over.'  ■  It  is  finished,'  I  alwavs  mean  something  definite,  a  series  of 
events  either  expected  or  going  on — ^a  plav,  ;i  piece  of  music,  or  a 
battle.  And  I  assume  that  the  person  who  hears  me  has  his  attention 
directed  toward  the  same  thing,  so  that  any  more  accurate  denotation 
is  unnecessarv.  Here  '  It '  is  a  real  pronoun,  which  isonlv  chosen  for 
the  sake  of  brevitv.  because  the  usual  denotation  of  what  I  mean  is 
superfluous,  or,  perhaps  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  meant,  too 
circumstantial." 

Hence  this  type  of  impersonals  does  not  really  belong  to  the  class, 
and  mav  be  thrown  out  altogether.  They  are  only  apparently  inijier- 
sonal  or  subjectless. 

This  leaves  us  with  two  tvpes  for  our  consideration.  ( )n  the  one 
hand  we  have  the  tvpe  of  judgment  in  which  the  subject  is  something 
general.  As  we  have  seen,  this  subject  mav  be  the  mass  of  sense 
experiences,  the  universe  in  general,  the  all-comprehending  Reality,  or 
again  something  or  another,  we  know  not  what.  The  attem])t  made 
bv  Jovanovich'  to  rule  out  this  tvpe  of  impersonal  judgment  is  alto- 
gether arbitrarv.  He  proceeds  upon  the  basis  that  such  judgments 
would  be  inipossible  to  primitive  men  and  are  rare  to  the  mind  of  the 
ordinarv  individual.  Now  it  maybe  true  that  the  logical  formulation  : 
"The  universe  in  general,"  "  The  all-comprehending  Reality,"  etc., 
may  be  very  far  indeed  from  most  minds,  but  this  is  no  objection 
applicable  to  the  case  in  hand.  The  thought  formulated  in  Oiese 
general  expressions  need  not  be  far  from  anv  man.  ])rimitive  or  reflert- 

'  Loc.  lit.,  p.  19  ;     loc.  lit.,  p.  IQ. 
'  Die  Impersiinalifn,  pp.  21  ff. 


24 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


ive.  Indeed,  the  type  of  thought  represented  in  these  is  vague,  undif- 
ferentiated, and  schematic.  In  them  a  predicate  now  defined  for  the 
first  time  is  referred  to  a  vague,  shadowv  whole  which  has  been  experi- 
enced and  which  now  is  just  beginning  to  be  brolcen  up  and  distin- 
guished. In  fact,  the  reference  of  the  experience  to  the  all-compre- 
hending Reality  presupposes  a  simpler  and  earlier  stage  of  thought 
than  that  represented  either  in  the  thought  that  the  subject  is  a 
particular  thing  endowed  with  life,  or  cloud  gods,  or  even  such  a  god 
as  Zeus.  These  belong  to  the  stage  in  which  experience  has  become 
so  differentiated  that  particular  things  mav  be  regarded  as  the  causes 
of  certain  phenomena. 

Again,  the  fact  that  so  many  types  of  theory  have  arisen  which  have 
in  common  only  this  that  their  subjects  are  general  show  that  a  grad- 
ual differentiation  has  taken  place  witliin  this  class  of  theories.  This 
differentiation  has  proceeded  from  stage  to  stage,  until  finally  the 
undifferentiated  subject  has  become  so  definite  as  to  take  on  the  form 
of  a  particular  thing  to  which  reference  might  be  made.  This  idea  is 
further  supported  by  the  fact  that  no  hard  and  fast  line  can  be  drawn 
between  those  impersonals  to  which  we  now  add  a  purely  formal  sub- 
ject and  those  in  which  the  impersonal  pronoun  has  a  definite  signifi- 
cation. This  type  of  impersonal  may  be  regarded  as  exhibiting  the 
characteristics  of  the  ordinary  discursive  judgment.  And  from  this 
point  of  view  the  statement  of  Lotze  that  the  impersonal  has  preserved 
to  us  practically  the  original  and  simplest  form  of  the  discursive  judg- 
ment, seems  to  be  correct. 

Turning  to  the  other  great  division  of  impersonals,  we  note  that 
the  experience  centers  itself  in  an  immediately  recognized  whole.  As 
distinguished  from  the  first  great  division,  there  is  no  conscious  refer- 
ence to  a  subject,  however  indefinite.  Here  we  must  review  the  theory 
of  Sigwart. 

He,  it  will  be  remembered,  maintains  that  in  tl^e  true  impersonal  a 
present  impression  is  recognized  by  means  of  an  idea  or  memory 
image  of  a  past  experience.  Now  it  cannot  be  denied  that  in  the 
recognition  of  an  experience  an  impression  and  a  memory  image  are 
involved.  Were  it  not  so,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  recognition 
at  all.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  memory  image  and  the  impres- 
sion be  held  apart  and  referred  to  one  another.  And  this  would  seem 
to  be  the  case  with  impersonals.  For  Sigwart  the  subject  is  found  in 
the  sense   impression  and  the  predicate   in   the   memory  image.      Now 


THE     IMI'KKSONAI.    JUnOMKNT  25 

the  assertion  of  their  identity  must  be  made  consciously,  if  no  excep- 
tion to  the  ordinary  discursive  form  is  to  l)c  i)resented.  liul  this  is 
not  the  case.  It  is  onlv  upon  reflection  thai  we  become  aware  that 
there  is  an  inipression  and  an  idea.  In  the  experience  itself  the  two 
are  so  intimately  associated  tliat  we  are  conscious  onlv  of  the  result 
of  their  combination,  and  not  of  tlie  process  leading  to  this  combina- 
tion. For  examj)le,  let  us  take  the  case  of  "  Fire."  When  the 
exclamation  is  suddenly  made,  we  do  not  think  of  the  impression,  and 
of  the  memory  image.  What  we  have  in  mind  is  simplv  the  familiar 
situation  —  an  experience  immediatelv  recognizetl.  I'rulv,  an  impres- 
sion is  present,  and  an  idea  bv  wiiich  the  impression  is  recognized. 
Hut  it  is  the  recognition  and  the  recognized  content  which  interest  us. 
No  discursive  reference  is  made.  So  in  all  the  cases  cited  above:  an 
experience  (be  it  an  intellectual  content,  an  affection,  or  an  activity) 
is  recognized  through  an  idea  which  is  immediatelv  assimilated  to  an 
impression  of  sense.  The  result  of  the  assimilation  alone  appears  in 
consciousness  in  an  experience  recognized  in  and  through  itself.  In 
short,  what  we  have  in  impersonals  are  cases  of  immediate  recognition. 

To  proceed  further.  There  are  two  forms  of  the  impersonal.  In 
one  an  experience  is  recognized  in  and  through  itself  as  a  totality  and 
in  an  immediate  way];  in  the  other  the  recognition  is  mediate  and  bv 
means  of  the  pasts.  The  former  is  non-discursive,  while  in  the  latter 
the  discursive  form  appears.  In  both  forms  there  isgrowili  indefinite- 
ness.  In  the  immediate  form  there  is  a  passage  from  the  merest 
scheme  of  a  separable  situation  to  a  situation  or  experience  so  definite 
and  complex  that  recognition  can  no  longer  be  immediately  made, 
and  a  predicate  referred  to  this  total  experience  appears. 

So  also  with  the  discursive  form.  The  subject  passes  from  the 
barest  indication  of  a  subject  through  varying  degrees  of  definiteness, 
until  finally  some  definite  and  known  subject  takes  the  place  of  the 
subject  impersonally  indicated. 

To  our  analysis  we  may  now  add  one  further  argument  in  proof  of 
our  theory.  This  theory  alone  harmonizes  the  varying  divergent 
views  which  have  been  held  from  earliest  times. 

Our  historical  review  showed  that  the  divergent  theories  could  be 
reduced  to  two  great  types:  (I),  those  which  asserted  that  the  subject 
must  be  individual  and  determined;  (1 1 ),  those  which  asserted  with 
eipial  force  that  the  subject  must  be  universal  and  more  or  less  unde- 
termined.     In  the  analysis  given  above  these  two  fall  together  in   the 


26 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


forms  of  the  impersonal  as  iiumediate  and  mediate.  Where  the  sub- 
ject is  individual,  it  is  immediately  assimilated  with  the  predicate  or 
idea,  /.  c  both  subject  and  predicate  really  disappear  ;  and  where  the 
discursive  form  really  comes  on  the  scene,  the  subject  is  undetermined 
and  universal. 

But  not  onlv  does  our  view  enable  us  to  harmonize  the  views  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  the  subject  sought  ;  it  also  shows  us  how , we  mav 
place  the  presupposition  which  forced  so  many  investigators  to  seek 
for  a  subject. 

It  was  admitted  as  incontrovertible  that  a  predicate  could  not  be 
thought,  apart  from  a  subject.  The  two  are  corelative.  In  the  dis- 
cursive form  of  the  impersonal  we  noted  that  certain  qualities  were 
abstracted  and  referred  to  a  subject,  whether  it  was  completely  unknown 
and  indeterminate  or  only  partly  so.  pjut  in  the  immediate  form  of 
the  impersonal  no  abstraction  was  made.  There  was  no  reference  of 
parts  to  a  whole  :  the  qualitative  experience  was  recognized  and  asserted 
as  a  totality.  The  meaning,  instead  of  being  gained  piecemeal,  was 
flashed  into  the  mind  at  once.  Now,  inasmuch  as  the  function  of 
judgment  is  that  of  obtaining  truth  or  meaning,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  impersonal  is  truly  a  judgment.  \\\  fact,  nobody  has  denied 
this.  And  yet,  if  this  be  so,  it  is  impossible  that  the  nature  of  the 
judgment  can  be  summed  up  in  the  discursive  form.  As  Miklosich 
asserted,  our  ideas  of  the  judgment  must  be  radically  remodeled.  The 
impersonal  as  immediate  presents  us  with  a  form  of  judgment  in  which 
there  is  no  subject  and  no  predicate.  The  function  of  both  is  represented 
in  an  experience  or  situation  of  such  a  degree  of  definiteness  as  to 
have  an  individuality  of  its  own,  and  in  which  a  totality  is  recognized 
or  asserted  as  real.  The  discursive  judgment  gives  us  meaning  and 
recognizes  reality,  but  through  the  mediation  of  the  whole  by  its  parts. 
Some  predicate  is  emphasized  for  the  timebeing,  and  is  asserted  as  sus- 
taining a  definite  relation  to  the  subiect-matter  to  which  it  referred. 
Judgment  thus  consists  essentially  in  the  recognition  or  appreciation 
of  reality,  whether  in  an  immediate  or  in  a  mediate  way.  It  is  only  in 
the  mediate  form  in  which  the  recognition  of  the  whole  takes  place 
through  the  emphasis  and  development  of  the  parts.  In  this  con- 
nection several  points  must  be  noted: 

I.  It  will  be  objected  to  our  assertion  ot  the  originality  of  the 
impersonal  judgment  that  in  certain  languages  the  impersonal  symbol' 
arises  after  such  definite  subjects  as  Zeus  and  Jupiter  have  been  found 


"SSSSs 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  2"] 

insufficient.  It  will  be  said  that  tlie  proijress  of  thought  found  such 
expressions  unsatisfactory  and  unscientific,  and  that  then  the  imper- 
sonal arose  and  was  used  to  indicate  a  perfectlv  undetermined  subject. 

Ne)\v.  it  is  true  that  if  everv  impersonal  arose  after  the  determined 
judgment,  the  assertion  that  the  imiJcrsonal  form  of  judgment  was 
original  would  most  certainly  be  false.  Hut  seyeral  fads  must  be 
noted.  The  objection  takes  into  account  onlv  those  forms  of  judg- 
ment in  which  there  is  an  impersonal  formal  symbol.  All  those  forms 
of  e.xpression  in  which  the  judgment  e.\])resses  an  iiiniiediately  recog- 
nized experience  haye  been  left  out  altogether.  So  that  even  if  we 
were  to  admit  that  the  objection  held  as  regards  those  forms  which 
possess  the  formal  symbol,  our  contention  would  still  hold  good.  lUit, 
again,  how  far  this  claim  of  the  late  origin  of  the  formal  "it"  is  true  is 
a  matter  of  grave  dispute.'  Finally,  the  difficulty  arises  mainly  from 
the  confusion  of  the  impersonal  symbol  with  the  neuter  pronoun.  The 
impersonal  expression  may  indicate  many  different  degrees  of  determi- 
nation, and  to  confine  the  meaning  to  the  neuter  "  It  "  is  an  impossi- 
bility. I'he  indefinite  neuter  may  well  have  arisen  late  and  have  suc- 
ceeded more  definite  and  personal  forms.  But  this  has  nothing  to  say 
against  the  originality  of  the  true  impersonal. 

2.  We  may  also  be  asked  what  relation  the  impersonal  situation  or 
experience  bears  to  ordinary  sensation.  Both  are  immediate,  and  in 
James'  terms  might  be  spoken  of  as  "  acquaintance  with,"  ^yhile  the 
discursive  form  of  judgment  would  fall  iiiidcr  the  category  of 
**  knowledge  about."  The  chief  difference  (and  it  is  an  important  one) 
is  that  of  complexity.  We  commonly  regard  sensation  as  the  simi)lest 
element  in  consciousness  at  which  analysis  can  arrive.  Or,  again,  it  is 
the  immediate  result  in  consciousness  of  an  affection  of  the  organism. 
The  impersonal  judgment  (in  its  immediate  form)  points  to  a  differ- 
entiation within  the  "  big,  buzzing,  blooming  confusion  "  of  early 
consciousness.  Certain  centers  or  kernels  of  experience  have  been 
formed,  each  of  which  immediately  feels  and  recognizes  its  own 
totality.  These  centers  have  been  differentiated  sufficiently  to  be  cen- 
ters, but  not  sufficiently  to  give  rise  to  a  discursive  division  within 
themselves. 

These  remarks  really  conclude  our  analysis  of  the  nature  of  imper- 
sonal judgments  as  we  meet  with  them  in  adult  consciousness.     Before 

'  C/.    Miklosich,  Suhjcctiosc   S.at/e,  pp.  \y  ff.;    Tli.  \Wx\{<i\,  Gotttnuisdten  iieUhrlfu 
Anzeiceti,  1S65,  pp.  177S-02;    Taiil,  I'rinciplfs  (if   Languages, /ri.  i/V.,  p.  22. 


28 


THE    JMPERSONAL    JUDGKMNT 


proceeding  to  inquire  into  the  significance  of  the  impersonal  it  maybe 
well  to  summarize  our  results  so  far  : 

I.  The  impersonal  judgment  has  two  forms:  i,  the  original,  in 
which  an  experience,  whether  on  the  side  of  content,  of  affection,  or 
of  activitv,  is  recognized  as  an  immediate  and  more  or  less  definite 
situation  ;  2,  the  secondary,  in  wliich  this  immediate  experience 
sj)lits  u])  into  subject  and  predicate,  the  predicate  consisting  of  an 
event  or  experience  abstracted  from  the  total  content  and  referred  to  a 
subject,  either  as  unknown,  as  the  totality  of  experience,  or  as  some  form 
of  a  general  and  undifferentiated  subject. 

II.  In  both  the  immediate  and  the  discursive  forms  of  this  imj)er- 
sonal  growth  or  differentiation  takes  place.  The  growth  within  the 
immodiate  form  makes  the  ex])erience  so  complex  -that  it  can  no 
longer  be  recognized  as  a  totality,  but  must  attain  unity  through 
conscious  analysis  and  synthesis  —  /.  e.,  through  the  conscious  medi- 
ation of  the  whole,  through  the  parts  and  the  references  of  the 
parts  in  definite  relations  to  the  whole.  In  the  discursive  imper- 
sonal growth  represents  itself  in  a  constant  organization  of  the  subject- 
matter,  until  finally  the  subject  is  reduced  from  the  universe  in  general, 
the  totality  of  being,  to  some  definite  thing,  at  which  stage  the  imper- 
sonal displaces  the  particular   judgment. 

III.  ( )ur  conception  of  the  nature  of  judgment  must  be  modified. 
The  traditional  view  has  been  that  all  judgment  is  discursive,  and  con- 
sists solely  in  references.  It  is  now  evident  that  the  discursive  judg- 
ment IS  simply  one  phase  of  judgment.  Although  it  may  be  true  that 
there  can  be  no  predicate  without  a  subject,  it  may  also  be  true  that 
there  is  a  form  of  judgment  where  neither  subject  nor  predicate 
appears. 

This  was  given  in  the  immediate  impersonal  judgment  in  which  a 
definite  experience  or  reality  was  recognized  in  and  through  a  totality. 
Tlie  real  nature  of  judgment  would  thus  seem  to  be  recognition  or 
association,  and  this  in  two  ways  :     [a]    immediately,  (/')  mediately. 


C.      TIIK  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE   IMF^ERSONAE  jLDGMENT. 

The  impersonal  judgment  has  significance  in  <^ur  present  investi- 
gation in  two  ways,  and  in  both  of  these  its  significance  is  very 
great. 

They  are:  (I),  its  significance  for  logic;  [\\),  its  significance  for 
psychology. 


Till".     IMl'KKSONAl.    jLIXi.MENT  29 

I.      THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OV     IHF.     IMPERSONAL    KoR     I.OOIC 

has  already  been  dealt  with  to  some  extent.      It  lias  been  seen  that  the 
traditional  view  of  the  judi^ineni  must  be  radically  remodeled. 

It  has  been  agreed  tluit  judgment  has  had  lo  tlo  with  the  appre- 
hension of  meaning.  Hut  this  apprehension,  according  to  the  old 
view,  must  be  discursive.  Realitv  in  whatever  form  was  recognized 
niediatelv  through  the  reference  of  an  idea  beyond  itself  to  some 
whole  apprehended  through  it.  The  earlier  view  that  in  judgment 
two  or  more  separate  notions  were  united  was  displaced  by  the  view 
that  the  judgment  is  unitary.  In  it  a  whole  is  grasped,  but  grasi)ed 
through  the  mediation  or  adjustment  of  the  parts.  The  parts  are, 
as  Bradley  calls  them,  adjectives  torn  from  tlie  mere  psychosis  and 
used  to  indicate  or  symbolize  the  whole  experience  apprehended  as 
meaning.  In  tliis  discursive  form  it  was  imperative  that  every  predi- 
cate should  have  a  subject,  for  the  very  nature  of  the  act  of  predication 
involved  a  subject  of  which  predication  was  made.  The  impersonal, 
which  was  really  a  judgment  (for  in  it  reality  was  apprehended  and 
meaning  asserted),  refused  to  conform  to  the  general  rule,  for  in  most 
cases  no  subject  could  be  found  for  it  at  all.  Quite  fictitious  subjects 
were  made  for  it,  but  on  the  whole  it  was  treated  as  an  anomaly.  It 
never  seemed  to  be  considered  that  anomalies,  exceptions,  are  often 
the  most  fruitful  things  for  anv  investigation.  A  thorough-going 
consideration  has  shown  that  the  impersonal  truly  asserts  or  appre- 
hends meaning,  and  that  its  nature  is  not  discursive.  The  meaning 
is  recognized  not  through  the  reference  of  the  parts  to  the  whole. 
No  symbol  is  abstracted  and  referred  beyond  itself.  Parts  and  whole 
are  apprehended  in  the  same  act  and  immediately.  There  is  meaning, 
and  we  stand  face  to  face  with  it.  Realitv  truly  is  recognized  and 
asserted,  but  not  discursively,  and  svmbolization  is  necessary.  In  the 
one  case  no  abstraction  of  parts  which  are  symbolic  of  the  whole 
experience,  is  made.  The  experience  is  definite,  but  the  thinking  is 
concrete.  In  the  other  case  abstraction  from  the  reality  is  made,  and 
a  definite  symbol  is  used,  summarizing  and  organizing  the  whole 
body  of  experiences  which  it  indicates.  In  this  case  thinking  is 
abstract.  The  impersonal  judgment  is  less  definite  and  free  when 
the  experience  asserted  has  meaning  for  itself  alone,  and  its  parts 
are  so  taken  up  into  the  total  experience  that,  although  some  definite- 
ness  has  been   introduced,  the  measure  according  to  which  definition 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


has  been  made  has  not  been  clearly  before  the  mind.  It  has  this 
advantage,  however,  that  it  feels  itself  to  be  in  most  intimate  relation 
to  realitv,  is  organically  one  with  it,  and,  again,  it  is  thoroughly  con- 
crete and  for  itself. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  discursive  judgment  which  makes  use  of 
symbols  is  more  free  from  individual  experiences  and  can  indicate 
or  refer  to  a  wider  range,  in  the  discursive  judgment  the  idea  of 
universality  comes  in.  Not  only  is  the  discursive  form  of  judgment 
freer  than  this  impersonal,  but  it  is  also  more  definite.  The  symbol 
which  is  abstracted  becomes  a  common  measure  of  the  various 
experiences  to  which  it  refers.  And  not  only  so,  but,  in  becoming  a 
measure,  its  own  nature  as  a  measure  becomes  more  exact,  and  the 
relations  in  which  it  stands  to  tlie  ex])eriences  which  it  indicates 
are  more  fullv  known.  Finallv.  in  the  universal  judgment  the 
symbol  is  taken  as  perfectly  exact,  both  in  its  own  nature  and  in  its 
reference  ;  that  is,  the  svmbol  has  become  fullv  abstracted  and  freed. 
We  know  exactly  what  it  means,  and  to  just  what  it  refers.  In  short, 
we  have  exact  measurement,  through  symbolization  in  which  the 
nature  of  the  measure  is  exactly  known  and  can  be  used  in  perfectly 
identical  ways,  and  also  in  which  its  range  of  reference  is  known,  /.  <? . , 
its  universality.  In  other  words,  the  svmbol  in  a  discursive  judg- 
ment aims  finally  to  be  used  as  a  tool. 

But  while  the  judgment  gains  in  exactness  and  universality  by 
becoming  abstract,  it  loses  the  appreciation  of  the  wealth  of  individual 
experience  which  is  present  to  the  impersonal.  We  might  compare  the 
two  in  this  way:  The  impersonal  is  individual,  concrete,  but  inexact ; 
the  discursive  judgment  is  exact  and  definite,  but  abstract,  losing  the 
warmth  and  color  which  belong  to  the  indefinite. 

This  leads  us  to  a  further  point  in  reference  to  the  judgment.  It 
would  seem  to  be  desired  that  we  should  get  the  full  value  of  the  con- 
creteness  and  intimacy  with  reality  which  the  impersonal  asserts,  and 
yet  maintain  the  exactness  of  freedom  which  gives  universality  to  the 
discursive  judgment.  Nor  have  we  to  go  wanting.  There  is  a  stage 
of  experience  in  which  both  sides  are  united,  and  in  which  in  an  imme- 
diate way  we  realize  the  full  value  of  the  individual  side  of  our  exjieri- 
ence,  while  maintaining  perfect  exactness.  In  such  cases  the  n)ind, 
indeed,  works  at  its  best.  The  stage  I  refer  to  is  that  of  intuitive  thought. 
We  refer  to  it  in  other  words  as  the  expert  judgment,  and  at  other  times 
realize  it  when  we  are  "lost  in  our  work,"  as  we  say.      In  all  such  cases 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  11 

the  mind  is  perfectly  familiar  with  its  material.  Thought  is  most  exact. 
The  measures  which  in  the  discursive  stage  are  used  as  symbols  are  still 
measures.  The  mind  knows  exactly  what  its  measures  are  and  the 
range  of  their  application.  Each  problem  is  solved  as  it  presents  itself. 
No  puzzling,  no  endeavor  to  refer  is  necessary.  The  whole  is  present 
as  a  whole,  and  with  all  its  parts  perfectly  distinct  and  clear-cut.  Com- 
plete immersion  in  the  concrete  detail  and  complete  correctness  con- 
cerning the  nature  and  range  of  each  measure  are  present.  Perhaps 
the  most  characteristic  examples  of  this  exj)erience  are  those  of  the 
artist  (whether  musician,  poet,  or  what  not)  and  the  thinker  when  ctfm- 
pletely  "lost"  in  his  problem.  When  we  say  that  the  artist  or  thinker 
is  "lost"  in  what  he  is  doing,  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is  no  conscious- 
ness of  the  material  he  has  in  hand.  Quite  otherwise.  He  is  most 
certainly  '"lost"  to  the  outside  world,  but  lie  is  most  vividly  conscious 
of  that  experience  to  which  his  mind  is  directed.  To  the  musician 
there  would  be  neither  his  own  life  nor  music  as  such.  It  would  rather 
become  living  music.  Every  part  of  the  music  is  clear,  definite,  exact ; 
but  also  every  part  is  lived  out  and  felt  through  and  through.  The 
expert  shot  may  be  said  to  make  no  discursive  judgment.  The  bird 
rises  in  some  particular  direction  ;  the  estimation  of  distance,  direction, 
and  sighting  are  made  practically  instantaneously,  or,  as  we  say,  alto- 
gether without  thinking.  Because  he  is  so  familiar  with  shooting  and 
has  made  his  synibols  perfect  tools,  he  can  now  act  without  hin- 
drance and  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  a  perfectly  exact  outcome.' 

Thus   in  judgment  we  would   seem   to   have  two   forms  and   three 

'Of  course  it  may  be  said  that  the  expert  tvpe  of  activity  is  jnircly  rctk-x  and 
mechanical.  It  is  a  fact  that  actions  performed  consciously  do  become  mechanical. 
But  the  leflex  interpretation  seems  to  be  inadequate  in  tlie  present  case,  and  for  the 
foUowinis'  reasons  : 

I.  .Actions  which  become  reflex  drop  out  of  consciousness.  It  may  perhaps  be 
said  that  we  get  the  value  of  the  experience  returned  in  terms  of  feelini;.  This  is 
true.  But  the  more  deeply  set  in  the  organism  the  activity  becomes,  the  less  the  con- 
scious value  appears. 

Now,  take  the  case  of  the  musician.  When  he  is  lost  in  his  music  we  cannot  say  that 
the  value  of  the  experience  is  merelv  felt,  or  that  the  process  is  purely  mechanical,  for  it 
is,  in  fact,  in  such  mr)ments  that  he  gets  the  full  consciousness  of  everv  shade  and  turn 
of  the  technique  of  his  performance  and  its  outcome.  livery  turn  of  thought,  every 
shade  of  emotion  are  present  in  consciousness  and  are  immediately  responded  to  in 
swift,  clear  thought  and  action.  There  is  a  difference  between  a  player  taken  with 
paralysis  who  nevertheless  goes  on  plaving,  and  the  football  expert  who  notices 
every  movement  of  his  advcrsarv  and   consci'iu>lv  meets  the  emergencv.     ()utwardly 


32  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

Stages.  The  two  forms  are  those  of  the  immediate  and  mediate;  the 
three  stages  those  of  the  impersonal,  the  discursive,  and  the  intuitive. 
In  the  impersonal  judgment  an  experience  is  immediatelv  recog- 
nized, asserted,  and  felt  as  real.  But  although  the  experience  is  more 
or  less  definite,  in  that  it  is  an  experience,  no  exact  measurement  has 
as  vet  been  introduced  through  the  use  of  an  exact  svmbol.  But  as  the 
experience  becomes  more  complex  and  definite  within  itself,  and  as 
greater  demands  are  made,  this  svmbol  finallv  arises  through  the 
abstraction,  isolation,  and  definition  of  some  particular  qualitv.  In 
this  stage  of  judgment  tlie  form  becomes  discursive.  The  whole  can- 
not be  measured  immediatelv,  but  must  be  broken  up  into  parts  which 
are  controlled  bv  the  various  svmbols.  The  svmbols  have  reference 
beyond  their  own  immediate  existence.  Thev  indicate  the  particulars 
for  which  they  stand,  and  build  the  meaning  which  thev  present  into 
some  consistent,  definitely  universal,  but  mediatelv  recognized  whole. 

the  two  activities  may  appear  the  same,  but  inwardly  there  is  all  the  difference  of  light 
and  darkness  between  the  two.  In  the  one  case  there  is  simply  a  machine,  and  in 
the  other  a  living  personalitv. 

2.  We  are  forced  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  thinker  lost  in  his  thought, 
yet  to  whom  every  shade  and  turn  of  the  argument  is  clear,  and  the  mystic  who  has 
driven  every  idea  out  of  mind,  and  who  has  passed  the  subject-object  stage.  The  thinker 
lives  above  the  subject-object  stage,  the  mvstic  below  it.  In  the  one  case  the  mind  is 
full  of  ideas,  feelings,  activities,  the  whole  being  is  active  and  alive.  In  the  other  there 
is  a  dearth  of  ideas,  a  passivity  of  being,  a  mere  existence. 

3.  The  reflex  interpretation  of  the  intuitive  experience  fails  to  account  both  for 
the  mental  alertness  of  the  musician,  thinker,  plaver,  or  sportsman,  and  for  the  rapid 
accommodation  made  necessary  bv  the  changing  environment.  The  expert  must  "  in  a 
flash  "size  up  each  situation,  and  his  expertness  consists  just  in  this.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  paralyzed  musician  may  play  very  delicately,  but  he  must  run  along  in  the 
grooves  of  past  experience.  His  behavior  is  like  that  of  a  locomotive  which  has  lost 
its  engineer.  If  the  switches  happen  to  be  properlv  arranged,  the  locomotive  will 
make  wonderful  excursions.  But  they  must  be  arranged  ;  itself  can  do  nothing.  So 
the  activities  of  the  musician  may  show  themselves  in  many  different  forms,  but  they 
lack  spontaneity  antl  adjustment.  This  adjustment  to  individual  experiences  is  char- 
acteristic of  all  stages  of  consciousness,  but  especiallv  of  the  subject-object  and  the 
intuitive  stages.  There  is  this  difference  between  the  latter  that  in  the  subject-object 
stage  we  are  trying  to  adjust  our.>elves,  anil  in  the  intuitive  stage  we  really  succeed 
in  the  sense  that  we  can  perform  the  action  immediately  and  without  friction. 

For  these  reasons  it  would  seem  that  the  intuitive  stage  is  the  unitv  of  the  sub- 
jective and  objective  phases  of  consciousness,  and  not  their  loss.  .\nd  it  would  seem 
more  reasonable.  For  if  as  action  becomes  perfected  it  disappears,  and  we  never  get 
the  full  value  of  the  means  in  the  end  of  the  techniijue  as  technique,  the  process  of 
experience  would  seem  to  be  worthless  and  selfcontradictorv. 


TllK    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  33 

Here  judgment  leaves  out  of  account  tlie  individuality  in  existence  of 
each  particular,  but  through  the  svuibol  it  becomes  n)ore  and  more 
exact,  both  in  meaning  and  in  reference,  until  it  figures  forth  the  uni- 
versal in  which  the  svmbol  has  been  whoUv  freed  from  the  individualitv 
of  particular  existences,  presenting  a  meaning  perfcctlv  definite  and 
identical  with  itself,  and  a  reference  whi(  h  takts  in  the  whole  scope  of 
its  meaning  and  is.  therefore,  universal.  Thus  the  discursive  stands  for 
perfect  exactness  and  universality  through  complete  svmbolization  or 
abstraction  of  certain  cpialities  required  for  the  particular  references 
and  indicated  in  the  meaning,  to  the  detriment  of  appreciation  of  the 
detail  of  individual  existence.  The  imperson;^!  fails  in  definiteness,  and 
the  discursive  in  appreciation.  Both,  however,  are  united  in  the  intui- 
tion. When  the  discursive  form  has  completed  itself  in  the  exjjert 
judgment  which  immediately  and  without  reference  recognizes  the 
exact  nature  and  range  of  meaning  of  their  symbols,  thev  pass  over 
into  the  intuitive  judgment.  In  this  stage  judgment  realizes  com- 
pletelv  the  individualitv  of  each  particular,  and  gets  the  full  coloring 
which  pertains  to  the  particular.  But  at  the  same  time  the  exactness 
and  definiteness  which  are  gained  onlv  through  mediation  of  the 
symbolic  stage  are  present. 

Hence  in  the  perfect  form  of  the  judgment  the  immediacv  as  well 
as  the  exactness  and  certaintv  of  the  earlier  stages  are  represented. 
As  immediate  it  has  all  the  warmth,  fullness,  and  glamor  which  per- 
tain to  anv  immediate  exj)erience,  while  as  summing  up  the  move- 
ment of  the  discursive  statre  it  is  inexact  and  universal. 

To  sunnnarize  this  stage  of  our  discussion  :  Judgment  has  to  do 
essentiallv  with  the  apprehension  of  meaning,  the  recognition  of 
realitv.  In  its  earlier  stages  this  apprehension  takes  the  form  of  the 
immediate  recognition  of  wholes  which  are  definite  enough  to  be  used 
as  centers  of  experience,  but  in  which  there  is  not  vet  a  clear  and 
exact  definition  of  parts.  The  experience  is  apj^rehended  as  a  totalitv. 
But  this  experience  gradually  becomes  more  definite  within  itself,  until 
there  is  a  necessitv  of  adjusting  the  parts  within  one  another  in  refer- 
ence to  the  whole.  Division  arises.  Qualities  are  abstracted  from  the 
whole  and  are  used  as  svmbols  in  terms  of  which  the  whole  experience 
is  measured.  Through  continued  growth  the  symbols  acquire  definite- 
ness, both  as  to  their  own  meaning  and  as  to  their  range  of  inference. 
The  final  stage  is  that  in  which  the  exact  nature  of  the  symbol  is 
known,  and  its  exact  range  of  reference  is  also  known.      Where  this  is 


34  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

the  case,  the  identitv  of  the  symbol  and  the  universality  or  complete- 
ness of  its  range  are  both  known.  This  gives  us  the  universal  form  of 
judgment.  To  most  of  us  this  identity  and  universality  are  purely 
formal,  /.  i\.  we  have  learned  to  recognize  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
identity  and  universality  in  judgment,  but  we  practically  never  get 
within  our  own  minds  a  complete  and  exact  definition  either  of  the 
nature  of  any  of  our  symbols  or  of  the  exact  range  of  their  significa- 
tion. In  those  few  cases  in  which,  in  any  department  and  in  the  minds 
of  a  few  men,  this  identity  and  universality  have  been  realized,  with  ref- 
erence to  any  content,  in  these  cases  freedom  in  the  manipulation  and 
apj)reciation  of  the  material  is  seen.  But  when  this  stage  is  reached  — 
the  stage  of  ilic  expert  judgment  —  there  is  no  longer  hesitancy  in 
regard  to  the  use  of  material,  no  retardation  in  inhibition.  The  con- 
tent is  fullv  apj)reriated  in  its  individuality  of  coloring  and  existence, 
and  is  also  grasped  in  the  exactness,  identity,  universality,  and  perfect 
placing  of  the  material.  That  is,  once  more  the  division  into  subject 
and  object  disappears,  and  we  are  in  the  presence  of  an  immediately 
recognized  reality.  But  it  is  immediacy  which  differs  from  the  imper- 
sonal in  that  it  is  definite  and  universal,  whereas  the  earlier  experience 
was  indefinite  and  individual.  Thus  the  discursive  judgment  logically 
arises  out  of  and  returns  into  the  immediate  judgment.  In  the  discur- 
sive stage  the  judgment  must  be  twofold,  but  in  both  the  impersonal 
and  intuitive  stages  subject  and  predicate  disappear.  In  the  imper- 
sonal stage  they  have  not  vet  been  differentiated,  while  in  the  intuitive 
they  disappear  into  an  exact  and  immediately  recognized  whole. 

II.       SIGNIFICANCE    FOR    PSVCHOLOGV. 

When  once  we  have  clearly  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  discursive 
judgment  arises  out  of  the  impersonal  and  tends  to  pass  over  into  the 
intuitive  or  expert  judgment,  the  significance  of  the  impersonal  in  the 
construction  of  our  theory  of  the  development  of  consciousness 
becomes  exceedingly  important. 

The  impersonal  judgment  points  to  a  state  of  consciousness  in 
which  all  experience  is  recognized  as  a  totality,  and  not  by  conscious 
mediation  of  the  parts.  The  discursive  judgment,  in  which  the  subject 
and  predicate  appear,  and  in  which  immediate  recognition  passes  over 
into  mediate  recognition,  indicates  not  a  totality,  but  a  whole.  It 
grasps,  or  endeavors  to  grasp,  through  the  definition  and  conscious 
reference  of  part  to  part.    Consciousness  is  split  up,  a  dualism  appears 


THE    IMTEKSONAI.    JUDGMENT  35 

within  it.  The  movement  involves  every  phase  of  consciousness  and  is 
most  fullv  expressed  in  the  o])position  of  subject  and  object,  of  the 
known  and  the  unknown.  Finaliv.  this  opjjosition,  which  occupies  us 
almost  exclusively,  is  never  consciously  transcended,  except  in  a  few 
rare  moments  when  we  lose  ourselves  in  our  thou<;ht  or  actions.  Hut 
in  so  doiui;  we  maintain  clear  and  definite  consciousness,  while  feelinij 
ourselves  absolutely  one  witii  our  content  or  ex])erience.  Judired  from 
an  (///•/<>/•/ standpoint  this  loijical  relation  in  the  judi^Miant  would  seem 
to  point  to  the  origin  of  the  subject- object  consciousness  out  of  a  state 
of  consciousness  identical  with  that  given  in  the  intellect.  The  imper- 
sonal judgment,  on  the  other  hand,  tends  to  pass  over  and  find  its 
complete  fulfillment  in  a  state  of  consciousness  where  the  meaning  of 
subject  and  object  is  contained  in  a  higher  state  of  consciousness,  but 
a  stage  which  is  clear,  definite,  expert,  but  not  discursive. 

The  facts  bearing  on  the  origin  of  the  subject-object  conscious- 
ness should  be  found  {(J)  in  child  psychology.  {/>)  in  race  psychology. 
The  evidence  to  be  adduced  for  the  development  of  self-consciousness 
into  a  higher  phase  should  evidently  be  found  in  adult  psychology, 
if  anywhere.  The  first  two  points,  when  developed,  should  give  us 
insight,  not  only  into  origin  and  function  of  the  subject-object  con- 
sciousness, but  should  also  add  insight  to  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
theory  of  the  impersonal  advanced  above. 

I.'  The  child  enters  life  apparently  at  a  great  disadvantage  when 
compared  with  the  young  of  animals.  They  soon  learn  to  perform 
the  movements  and  to  engage  in  the  activities  peculiar  to  their  kind. 
Children,  on  the  other  hand,  have  to  serve  a  long  apprenticeship  before 
they  can  take  part  in  the  simplest  distinctively  human  activities. 
But  although  this  is  so,  the  huuian  animal  is  born  into  the  heritage  of 
a  social  and  psychical  environment  which  makes  him  rise  far  above  all 
others.  In  short,  the  child  life  furnishes  us  with  a  magnificent  example 
of  growth  from  very  small  to  very  great  and  complex  things. 

In  examining  the  stage  of  this  growth,  our  attention  must  neces- 
sarily be  directed  chiefly  to  the  development  of  the  child's  longer  age. 
Here  we  get  the  expression  of  the  childs  thought  in  ilefinite,  conciete 
forms,  and  while  reference  to  other  |)hases  of  the  child's  activity  will 
not  be  omitted,  our  point  of  view  is  necessitated  from  the  fact  that  we 

'  In  whole  section  c/.:  Tracy,  I'sychology  of  Chilillujod  ;  I'reyer,  Development  of 
the  Intellect ;  it/ei/i.  Development  of  the  Will  ;  Perez,  First  Three  Years  of  Childhood; 
•Moore,  .Mental  Development  of  a  Child  ;   Baldwin.  Mcnt.nl  Deveh-pment. 


36 


THE    IMPERSONAL     lUDGMENT 


approacli  tlie  whole  subject  in  connection  with  one  aspect  of  the  judg- 
ment. 

During  the  lirst  six  niontlis  of  life  the  infant  does  not  make  anv 
appreciable  advance  in  language.  He,  as  it  were,  is  simply  soaking  in 
his  environment.  His  speech  consists  simply  of  spontaneous  babbling 
produced  automatically  bv  impulsive  exercise  of  his  vocal  nmscles. 
One  of  the  most  interesting  things  in  connection  with  these  early 
sounds  is  the  wide  range  of  their  compass.  All  shades  of  emotion  are 
expressed  in  forms  incapable  of  repetition  as  the  child  grows  older. 
Graduallv  out  of  this  strange  prattling  mass  definite  sounds  come  to  be 
distinguished;  vowels  usually  precede  consonants.  These  are  repeated 
over  and  over  again,  stimulating  themselves^  until  long  before  the  sixth 
moni"h  syllables  arise.  At  this  stage  reduplication  plavs  a  great  ]xirt ; 
for  instance,  "  ma"  becomes  "■mama."  This  shows  that  the  activities 
involved  in  luaking  these  sounds  tend  to  continue  and  stimulate  them- 
selves. This  has  been  called  the  "circular  form  of  reaction."  Indi- 
cative of  the  above  mentioned  form  of  activitv,  vocal  imitation  arises. 
At  first  it  is  vague  and. shadowy,  suggestive  and  impulsive,  rather  than 
clearlv  directed  and  controlled. 

In  the  second  six  months  imitation  becomes  ail-absorbing,  and 
consequentlv  words  begin  to  be  used  with  meaning.  The  vague  and 
shadowv  form  of  imitation  which  characterized  the  first  six  months 
gives  wav  to  a  more  definite  form.  Simple  imitation  tends  to  pass 
over  into  the  persistent  form.  With  this  growth  in  imitation  comes  an 
increased  power  of  attention.  In  earlv  life  the  child's  attention  is 
almost  altogether  at  the  mercv  of  external  circumstances.  But  through 
imitation  control  is  developed,  and  the  child  is  enabled  to  continue 
doing  something  suggested. 

At  this  time,  also,  the  child  commences  to  recognize  members  of  ihe 
household  bv  name  and  to  recognize  parts  of  his  own  bodv.  This 
shows  us  that  a  period  of  cjuite  extended  duration  is  reipiired  before 
there  is  developed  out  of  the  undifferentiated  whole  of  early  expe- 
rience the  consciousness  of  definite  experiences  and  of  definite  objects. 
This  statement,  which  is  true  of  all  sides  of  the  child's  life,  is  beauti- 
fully illustrated  from  the  side  of  language.  Taine,  in  speaking  of  the 
acquisition  of  language  by  his  own  child  and  in  dealing  with  this 
period,  savs  :  '  "  .Vs  vet  she  attaches  no  meaning  to  anv  word  she  utters, 
but  there  are  two  or   three  words  to  which  she  attaches  meaning  when 

^ Revue  Pliilosophiqtie,  No.  I;  Mind,  Vol.  II,  p.  252. 


THE    IMl'KHSONAI.    JUDGMENT  37 

she  hears  them.  She  sees  her  grandfather  every  day,  and  a  chalk  por- 
trait of  him,  much  smaller  than  life,  but  a  very  ijood  likeness,  has 
often  been  shown  her,  from  about  two  months.  When  asked  'Where 
is  grandfather  ?  '  she  turned  to  this  portrait  and  laughed.  Before  the 
portrait  of  her  grandmother,  not  so  good  a  likeness,  she  made  no  such 
gesture  and  gave  no  sign  of  intelligence.  From  eleven  monihs.  wiicn 
asked  '  Where  is  mamma  ?'  she  turned  toward  her  mother,  and  she  did 
the  same  thing  for  her  father."  Here  we  have  intelligence  and  recog- 
nition. The  "big.  buzzing,  blooming  confusion"  of  early  life  has 
gradually  passed  into  the  recognition  of  e.xperiences  separated  out  from 
the  undifferentiated  totalitv  and  forming  more  or  less  definite  centers. 
But  we  must  not  suppose  that  in  these  e.xperiences  we  have  anything 
more  than  situations  immediately  recognized  and  grasped  in  their 
totality.  Taine  continues:  "I  should  not  venture  to  say  that  these 
three  actions  surpass  the  intelligence  of  animals.  A  little  dog  under- 
stands as  well  when  it  hears  the  word  "sugar  ;'  it  comes  from  the  end 
of  the  »rarden  to  tret  a  bit.  There  is  nothing  more  in  this  than  asso- 
elation  :  for  the  dog,  between  a  sound  and  some  sensation  of  taste;  for 
the  child,  between  a  sound  and  the  form  of  an  individual  face  perceived. 
The  object  denoted  by  the  sound  has  not  yet  a  general  charaeter.^  However, 
I  believe  a  step  was  made  at  twelve  months.  Here  is  a  fact  decisive  in 
mv  opinion.  This  winter  she  was  carried  everv  day  to  her  grandniother 
who  showed  her  a  painted  copy  of  a  picture  by  Luini,  of  the  infant 
Jesus,  naked,  saving  at  the  same  time,  'There  isbebe.'  .\  week  ago,  in 
another  room,  when  she  was  asked  'Where  is  bebe  ?  '  meaning  herself, 
she  turned  at  once  to  tiie  pictures  and  engravings  that  happened  to 
be  there.  Bebe  has  tlien  a  general  signification  for  her,  viz.:  what 
ever  she  thinks  is  common  to  all  pictures  and  engravings  of  figures 
and  landscapes  —  that  is  to  sav,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  something 
t'ariegated  in  a  shining  frame.  In  fait,  it  is  clear  that  the  objects  painted 
or  drajvn  in  a  frame  are  as  Greek  to  her.  On  the  other  hand,  the  bright 
square  enclosing  any  representation  must  have  struck  her.'  This  is  her 
first  general  word.  The  meaning  she  gives  it  is  not  what  we  give  it, 
but  it  is  only  the  better  fitted  for  showinj,--  the  original  work  of  infant 
intelligence.  For  if  we  supply  the  word  we  did  not  supj)ly  the  mean- 
ing :  the  general  character  which  we  wish  to  make  the  child  catch  is 
not  that  which  she  has  chosen.  She  has  caught  another  suited  to  her 
mental  state,  for  which  we  have  no  jirecise  word." 
•  Italics  mine. 


» 


38 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


This  quotation  will  make  clear  to  us  that  in  this  recognition  bv  the 
child  we  have  no  reference  at  all  to  definite  objects.  Taine  himself 
admits  this.  All  that  existed  for  the  child's  mind  was  simply  a  defi- 
nite image,  which  she  recognized,  and  which  we  call  something  "varie- 
gated and  in  a  shining  frame."  But  if  this  be  so,  there  can  be  no 
meaning  in  speaking  of  the  child's  image  at  this  stage  as  a  general  idea. 
We  cannot  trulv  s])eak  of  an  abstraction,  for  as  vet  the  onlv  definite 
thing  is  tlie  recognized  experience.  In  it  there  is  no  reference  of  an 
idea  beyond  itself,  no  separation  between  existence  and  symbol.  \Miat 
we  are  inclined  to  call  the  svmbol  can  be  no  svmbol.  for  it  is  the  only 
realitv  definitelv  recognized  bv  the  child.  In  short,  to  speak  at  this 
stage  of  a  general  image  in  any  sense  in  which  it  can  be  used  as  a  svm- 
bol is  incorrect.  It  is  a  case  of  the  psvchologists'  fallacv.  To  the 
child  there  is  neither  a  particular  nor  an  idea.  We  distinguish  differ- 
ent things,  and  recognize  that  we  abstract  certain  qualities  which  are 
used  as  svmbols  or  signs  of  these  existences.  But,  as  we  have  seen, 
there  is  no  distinction  of  objects  to  the  child  at  this  stage.  Hence, 
there  can  be  no  abstraction  of  (pialities  in  anv  sense  in  which  thev  indi- 
cate some  object.  In  short,  the  vague  and  schematic  image  is  all  the 
object  there  is,  so  that  it  cannot  stand  for  anything  else.  We  do  put  it 
otherwise  to  the  child,  and  there  is  one  stimulus  and  one  reaction  in 
the  experiences  which  we  adults  regard  as  different. 

The  above  interpretation  throws  great  light  on  the  child's  develop- 
ment between  the  twelfth  and  eighteenth  months.  As  we  should  expect, 
there  is  a  marked  progress  in  the  understanding  of  words,  and  in  their 
intelligent  application.  In  longer  words  children  reproduce  the 
important  part  alone,  and  thev  now  begin  to  express  themselves  in 
sentence  words.  But  perhaps  the  most  interesting  feature  of  all  is  that 
the  childish  concept  endeavors  to  make  itself  exact  and  definite. 

On  this  point  Tracv  says  :'  "But  perhaps  the  the  most  interesting 
thing  of  all  this  time  is  the  gradual  'clearing-up'  of  the  childish  con- 
cepts, as  indicated  bv  the  steadv  circumspection  of  the  api)lication  of 
names.  Even  yet,  however,  names  are  applied  imuh  too  widelv ; 
much  more  experience  is  necessary  before  thev  accpiirc  in  the  voung 
mind  a  clear  and  defi'uite  connotation.  It  is  interesting,  also,  to  note 
how  the  principle  of  association  enters  as  a  factor  in  the  determina- 
tion of  the  ap[)lication  of  the  name,  ^^'hen  the  child  (alls  the  moon  a 
lamp,    or  applies   his  word  'bo'  (ball)    to  oranges,  bubbles,  and   other 

'  Psychology  of  Childhood,  p.  73. 


Till.    IMl'ERSONAL    JUDGMENT  39 

round  objects;  calls  everything  *  bow-wow'  which  bears  anv  sort  of 
resemblance  to  a  dog  (including  bronze  dogs  on  the  staircase,  and  the 
goat  in  the  yard);  applies  his  word  '  papa'  and  '  nianima'  to  all  men 
and  all  women,  respectively;  makes  his  word  'cutie'  do  dutv,  not  only 
for  'knife,'  but  also  for 'scissors,' 'shears,' 'sickle,' etc  ;  savs  '  ba' (bath) 
on  seeing  a  crust  dipped  in  lea;  applies  'ati'  (asses)  to  'tliair,'  '  foot- 
stool,' '  bench,'  '  sitting  down,'  '  sit  down.'  fit .;  ii  is  evident  ///(//  onf 
great  striking  resemhlanif  has  overshado7i't'ii  all  differ  t-uces  in  the  object.'" ' 
This  whole  i)aragraph  illustrates  the  point  which  we  made  above  in 
regard  to  the  "concept."  The  childish  ''concepts"  are  no  concepts  at 
all.  Differences  exist  in  the  objects  only  for  us.  Hence,  what  we  take 
to  be  the  reference  of  a  vague  recognition  of  similarities  in  objects  to 
different  objects,  is  not  all  indicative  of  the  true  state  of  things  in 
the  child's  mind.  What  he  reallv  has  in  mind  is  an  indefinite  image. 
Given  stimulations  which  have  any  similarity  at  all,  as  we  conceive  them, 
the  child  interprets  in  one  wav.  That  is,  to  the  child  there  is  but  one 
stimulus,  one  reaction,  one  object,  viz.,  an  experience  sutificientlv  dif- 
ferentiated to  be  grasped  as  a  totality,  and  to  be  recognized  in  and 
through  itself.  The  child  has  not  yet  got  to  a  stage  where  its  experi- 
ence, or  life,  is  sufficientlv  differentiated  to  admit  of  a  conscious  recog- 
nition and  reference  of  parts  in  a  whole.  This  stage,  however,  is 
reached  in  some  children  just  before  the  end  of  this  period.  Short 
sentences  are  used,  in  which  onlv  the  prominent  ideas  appear.  The 
full  meaning  of  the  stage  is  seen  in  the  period  ranging  from  the  eigh- 
teenth to  the  twentv-fourth  month.  I'rever  records  at  this  period,  "the 
greatest  progress,  however,  is  indicated  bv  the  combination  of  two 
woids  into  a  sentence."  The  two  words  really  used  are  a  noun  and  a 
verb.  Here  we  see  that  the  immediately  recognized  situation  which 
was  formed  out  of  the  chaotic  totalitv  of  early  conscious  experience 
has  itself  become  so  differentiated  that  unitv  in  differences  must  be  con- 
sciously recognized  within  the  former  totality.  A  dualism  has  apj)eared, 
which  is  represented  on  the  intellectual  side  in  the  discursive  judgment 
through  the  development  of  the  nominal  and  verbal  tendencies. 

Ikit  this  is  not  all.  Simple  imitation,  which  was  expressed  in  the 
circular  reaction  of  earlv  life,  gradually  passed  over  into  j)ersistent  imi- 
tation. This,  when  once  differentiated,  developed  rapidly,  showing 
itself  in  the  more  comjilete  ajiprehension  of  meaning,  and  in  the  devel- 
opment of  control.  In  this  |)eriod  an  independence  of  activity  (jiiite 
'Italics  mine. 


40 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


Strong  and  marked  showed  itself.  The  ambition  of  the  child  was 
aroused,  and  he  desired  to  go  his  own  way  without  hindrance.  It 
is  evident  from  this  that  we  have  here  to  do  with  the  dawn  of  self- 
consciousness  ill  llic  child.  That  is,  we  begin  to  see  traces  of  the 
recognition  of  self  as  self  at  the  time  when  the  impersonal  form  of 
expression  begins  to  pass  over  into  the  discursive  judgment. 

Thus  the  analysis  of  early  child  life  directly  confirms  the  account 
of  the  impersonal  judgment  given  above,  with  the  added  fact  that 
the  passage  from  the  impersonal  to  the  discursive  judgment  is  indica- 
tive of  the  development  of  self-consciousness  in  the  child. 

Now,  if  these  things  be  so,  some  trace  of  this  process  should  also  be 
found  in  the  differentiation  of  the  subject-object  consciousness  in  the 
race.  If  we  turn  our  thought  to  the  development  of  language,  we 
should  expect  to  find  the  different  parts  of  speech  disappearing,  first, 
into  a  twofold  movement  expressive  of  the  nominal  and  verbal  tend- 
encies, and,  secondly,  into  a  stage  in  which  meaning  is  represented  by  a 
form  of  thought  corresponding  to  the  impersonal.  At  the  point  where 
this  impersonal  stage  of  thought  passes  over  into  the  discursive  judg- 
ment\ve  should  expect  to  find  the  passage  from  the  animal  conscious- 
ness into  the  human. 

2.  In  entering  upon  this  division  of  our  subject,  a  distinction  must 
be  made  between  the  science  of  language  and  the  science  of  thought. 
The  Science  of  Language  observes  and  systematizes  the  various 
facts  and  forms  of  language,  and  seeks  to  formulate  the  laws  by  which 
it  has  been  and  is  governed  in  its  transformations.  It  seeks  to  under- 
stand the  vehicle  of  thought,  not  as  a  vehicle,  but  in  itself. 

The  Science  of  Thought  endeavors  to  investigate  the  psychological 
aspect  of  the  subject-matter  presented  by  the  Science  of  Language. 
Lansfuacfe  as  a  vehicle  is  made  to  contribute  to  the  understanding  of 
the  thought  of  which  it  is  the  vehicle. 

Now,  in  this  procedure  it  would  seem  that  the  Science  of  Thought 
is  dependent  upon  the  Science  of  Language,  and  must  wait  until  the 
latter  has  handed  in  its  results.  Tliis  is  true  to  a  very  great  extent. 
A  Science  of  Thought  cannot  be  manufactured  or  spun  out  of  our 
heads,  and  inasmuch  as  it  endeavors  to  construct  the  thought  move- 
ment, it  must  await  the  elucidation  of  the  forms  in  which  past  thought 
has  expressed  itself.  But  although  the  psychologist  may  depend  upon 
the  comparative  philologist  for  material,  it  is  as  material  that  he  receives 
it,  and  he  mav  feel  himself  free  to  interpret  the  facts  as  an  understand- 


Till".    IMPERSONAL    JUDCMENT  4I 

ing  of  them  from  the  psychological  standpoint  niav  demand.  Just  as 
the  philologist,  on  the  historical  side,  demands  that  he  should  be  free 
from  all  interference  from  psychologists  while  investigating  the  facts 
and  forms  of  language,  so  just  as  truly  may  the  psvclujlogist  demand  that 
the  philologist  should  give  simply  the  results  of  his  labor  as  material 
and  spare  the  advice  which  is  so  often  given. 

As  there  has  been  evolution  in  the  ph\si<  a!  and  organic  worlds,  so 
there  has  been  exolution  in  ihe  conscious  world.  ( )f  this  the  develoj)- 
ment  of  language'  is  one  of  the  most  evident  proofs.  As  civilization 
has  advanced,  language  has  been  continually  refined,  until  the  efficient 
and  graceful  instrument  which  we  find  in  mort-  advancetl  nations  in 
both  past  and  present  has  been  produced. 

It  may  further  be  noticed  that  the  earliest  stage  of  language  wliich 
the  philologist  can  reach  is  still  immeasurably  far  removed  in  time 
from  primitive  human  speech.  But  although  the  barrier  of  time  can 
never  be  overcome  and  we  can  never  present  the  primitive  language, 
still,  from  the  nature  of  the  development  within  language  itself,  we  tan 
form  a  quite  trustworthy  opinion  of  what  its  psychological  nature  must 
have  been.  This,  however,  is  to  presuppose  the  result  of  our  analvsis, 
to  which  we  must  now  proceed. 

In  the  unity  of  the  discursive  judgment  (recognized  by  all  and 
considered  by  most  to  be  the  only  true  form  of  judgment)  two  move- 
ments are  usually  distinguished  —  that  of  the  subject  and  that  of  the 
predicate.  These  united  in  the  copula  represent  the  content  of  the 
unified  thought.  In  these  two  movements  certain  distinctions  are 
now  made :  nouns,  adjectives  from  nouns,  adverbs,  etc.  Hut  while 
these  various  distinctions  are  recognized  by  philologists,  it  is 
emphasized  that  they  were  not  ahvavs  as  clearly  worked  off  as  they 
now  are.  As  we  go  backward  in  the  history  of  language,  the  differ- 
ences which  distinguish  the  nominal  and  verbal  movements  begin  to 
disapj)ear.  Not  only  do  the  differences  in  the  inflectional  forms  dis- 
appear, but  also  the  two  movements  themselves  become  confused,  in 
certain  cases  nouns  are  derived  from  verbs  and  verbs  irom  nouns. 
For  this  reason  endeavors  have  been  made  to  reduce  nouns  to  verbs, 
and  rice  versa.       l>ut   the  general  consensus  of  opinion   now  seems  to 

'  (.y.   Paul,    I'rinciples   nf   l..-ini;iia>,'c  ;    liruifmann,  Cumparative  Grammar  of  tlic 
Indo-Germanic  Lanis'uaijes,  Morphology,  Pt.    I,  p.  2;   Max    Miiller.  Science  of   I.an 
guage  and  Science  of  Thought;   Sayce,   Introtluction  to  the  Science  of  Language; 
Delbriick,  Introduction  to  the  .Study  of  I.anz.'aiagc  ;  Giles,  Comparative  Philologv. 


42 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMKNT 


be  that  so  far  language  does  not  admit  of  this  reduction.  As  far  back 
as  we  can  go  the  two  movements  remain,  the  one  as  distinct  as  the  other. 
But  contained  in  both  nominal  and  verbal  stems  there  has  been  a 
unity,  which  seems  to  indicate  that  they  arose  out  of  one  oriirinal 
form.  Concerning  this  point  a  great  deal  of  controversy  has  ariseji, 
and  the  end  is  not  yet.  Those  who  follow  the  Science  of  Language 
most  closely,  and  to  whom  philology  is  purely  formal  and  historical, 
insist  that  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  root  form  which  we 
have  is  original  and  indivisible;  e.g.,  Brugmann  says:'  "Strictly 
speaking  we  are  never  sure  in  the  case  of  a  suffix  which  has  come 
down  to  us  from  the  Indo-Germanic  j)arent  language,  whether  it  ever 
existed  as  an  independent  word,  exactly  in  the  same  shape  as  we 
extract  it  from  the  body  of  the  word,  or  whether  it  originally  consisted 
of  elements  which  passed  into  this  shape  by  a  regular  phonetic  change. 
It  is  theoretically  correct  when  we  say  that  the  root  of  a  word  is  found 
after  we  have  removed  all  formative  syllables  from  it.  But  in  the  first 
place,  we  do  not  know  what  shape  Indo-Germanic  words  had  toward 
the  end  of  the  root  period,  and  this  applies  especially  to  the  fact  that 
we  are  unable  to  say  whether  the  language  at  this  stage  j)Ossessed  only 
monosyllabic,  or  only  polysyllabic,  or  words  of  both  categories. 
Secondly,  the  analysis  of  elements  which  were  directly  annexed  to  the 
ends  of  roots  is  of  a  most  doubtful  nature.  And,  lastly,  we  are  unable 
to  determine  what  phonetic  changes  inflexional  compounds  had  under- 
gone from  the  beginning  up  to  the  dissolution  of  the  primitive  com- 
munity. Hence,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  roots  which  we  in 
ordinary  practice,  abstract  from  words  are  at  all  to  be  relied  upon,  as 
representing  the  word  forms  of  the  root  period.  A\'e  are  utterly  unable 
to  understand,  c.  g.,  whether  the  complex  a.  ii.3.  represents  a  unitary 
word  of  the  root  period,  or  whether  it  is  to  be  resolved  into  a.  n.  .'., 
that  is,  whether  j  was  a  suffix  and  thus  originally  an  independent 
element.  Such  being  the  state  of  things,  we  shall  retain  the  terms 
root  and  suffix  in  this  work  for  such  part  of  the  word  as'seq'  and 
'  e,'  '  tai,'  '  sequetai.'  .... 

"We  do  not,  however,  assert  that  the  elements  to  which  we  give 
these  names  ever  existed  as  independent  words.  We  merely  indicate 
by  means  of  hyphens  (-)  what  was  probably  felt  at  any  particular 
period    as    the    nucleus   (so    to   speak)   of   the   whole   system    of   word 

'Comparative  Grammar  of  the  Indo-Germanic  Languages,  Morphology,  I't.  L 
pp.  13-1S. 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  43 

forms  —  'secj'  and  "  e,"  what  was  rei^arded  as  the  formative  ele- 
ment." 

It  is  evident  from  this  tluit  the  root  has  been  taken  in  a  purely 
formal  wav  and  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Science  of  Language,  as 
dealing  simj)lv  with  the  facts  and  laws  of  linguistic  transformation.  It 
is  just  what  would  be  exjiected.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
the  word  forms  which  we  are  able  to  obtain  from  anv  known  language 
are  primitive  and  indivisible.  It  is  the  same  here  as  in  child  language. 
The  external  forms  mav  be  divided  and  subdivided,  until  the  external, 
formal  root  or  generalized  concept  as  expressed  in  language  has 
disappeared  into  the  crudest  articulations.  From  the  historical  and 
formal  standpoint  it  mav  be  said  that  the  death  blow  has  been  given 
to  anv  system  which  would  abstract  any  root  and  sav  that  it  was  the 
primitive  form. 

But  the  matter  ends  here  onlv  from  the  purelv  formal  and  liistorical 
standpoint.  The  logical  consideration  of  the  formation  of  roots  still 
remains,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt,  even  among  philologists  who 
emphasize  the  historical  side,  that  a  root  period  existed.  What  this  root 
period  stood  for,  and  what  its  general  nature  and  formation  were,  is  a 
further  and  legitimate  question.  And,  further,  it  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed that  it  is  our  purpose  to  indicate  what  particular  meaning  primi- 
tive roots  had.  Rather,  it  must  be  our  endeavor  to  find  out  whether  it 
is  more  natural  to  suppose  that  the  nominal  and  verbal  stems  are 
ultimate,  and,  therefore,  the  root  purelv  ideal,  or  whether  the  root  was 
the  real  unity  out  of  which  the  nominal  and  verbal  stems  differentiated. 

Kven  in  Hrugmann  wc  find  the  conception  that  the  root  is  a  nucleus 
or  kernel  around  which  the  thought  in  the  nominal  and  verbal  stem 
centers.  Further,  it  is  now  agreed  that  as  far  back  as  we  can  go 
the  two  forms  of  stem  begin  to  shade  into  one  another.  Novv,  if  we 
carry  this  thought  back  far  enough,  we  see  that  the  nominal  and  verba' 
stems  must  gradually  become  less  clearlv  differentiated  from  one 
another,  until  finally  thev  disappear  into  an  experience  in  whidi 
meaning  is  grasped  in  what  we  have  called  a  situation  or  totalitv,  as 
represented  in  the  impersonal  judgment.  How  manv  of  these  roots 
there  were,  and  what  their  particular  meaning  was,  we  cannot  sav. 
N'or  need  we  concern  ourselves  about  it.  All  that  interests  us  is  the 
function  which  this  root  stage  plaved  in  language. 

Here  we  may  make  a  quotation  from  Delbriick,'  which  deals  directly 

'  Intrixliirtiiin  tn  the  Slmlv  rif  Languages,  pp.  77  ff. 


44 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 


with  the  idea  of  roots.  He  savs  :  "  Bopp  derived  from  the  gram- 
matical tradition  of  his  time  the  principle  that  the  whole  word 
material  of  a  language  must  be  traced  back  to  roots.  However,  he  did 
not  express  any  opinion  whether  or  not  those  so-called  roots  shall  be 
regarded  as  real  linguistic  structures  or  onlv  as  abstractions  of  the 
grammarians.  But  Pott  savs  :  '  Roots  are  the  chieftains  of  a  word 
familv.  They  are  the  unitv.  the  j)vramidal  points,  in  which  all  mem- 
bers of  such  a  familv  terminate.  Only  composites  can,  like  married 
pairs,  belong  to  two  families.  Roots  are,  furthermore,  onlv  imagined, 
as  mere  abstraction:  in  realitv  there  can  be  no  roots  in  language. 
Whatever  may  wear  the  outward  appearance  of  a  pure  root  is  a  word  or 
a  word  form,  not  a  root  ;  for  a  root  is  an  abstraction  of  all  word  classes 
and  their  differences  —  a  possessing  of  them  without  refraction.  A 
root  is  not  like  a  letter  or  a  syllable  simplv.  It  is  also  the  unitv  of 
meaning  of  words  and  forms  which  genetically  belong  together,  and 
at  their  creation  were  present  as  prototypes  in  the  soul  of  the  language 
maker.  When  not  wholly  obscured,  it  is  felt  more  or  less  plainly 
by  every  speaker  in  connection  with  the  language  which  he  uses.' 
Add  to  this  :  '  Roots  are  ever  mere  ideal  abstractions  necessary  to  the 
grammarian  in  his  calling,  which  he  must  nevertheless  extract  from  lan- 
guage in  strict  conformity  with  the  given  reality.'  Pott  accordingly 
denies  that  roots  can  have  existed  before  the  inflectional  form.  If  now  it 
must  be  asserted  that  declension  arises  in  the  Sanskritic  languages  by 
the  affixion  of  inflectional  suffixes  to  the  fundamental  forms  of  the 
noun  and  conjugation  through  the  affixion  of  others  to  the  root  or 
stem,  this  must  not  be  understood  to  imply  that  the  fundamental  form 
and  the  root  are  something  existing  independently  and  out  of  con- 
nection in  language,  or  something,  as  it  were,  present  in  language 
before  inflertion.  What  is  reallv  meant  is  onlv  that  the  fundamental 
form  is  contained  in  all  the  cases  of  nouns,  and  the  root  in  all  verbal 
forms,  as  that  which  is  still  undifferentiated. as  that  which  is  common  to 
them,  which  grammatical  analysis  alone  for  scientific  ends  tries  to  free 
from  all  the  differentiated  characteristics  united  with  them,  and  to  dis- 
play in  all  its  simplicity.  This  definitio)i  of  Pott  is  correct  in  so  far  as  it 
rightly  defines  the  position  a  root  occupies  witliin  a  finished  inflectional 
language.  But  it  is  one-sided,  inasmuch  as  it  does  not  state  how  the  roots 
arrived  at  this  fujietion.  To  this  question  only  ine  ans7>.'er  is  possitdefrom 
the  standpoint  of  Bopp' s  hypothesis.  If  the  prototypes  of  the  now  existing 
inflectional  forms  really  arose  by  means  of  composition,  especially  the  proto- 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  45 

types  of  forms  of  the  finite  Vfrt\  by  composition  of  ij  rerlhil  'with  a  proiiom- 
inal  root,  then  the  root  must  hax'e  existed  before  the  jvord  existed.  Roots 
are  contained  in  7vords  because  they  existed  before  them,  and  were  merged 
in  them.  They  arc  the  words  of  the  pre-inflectionai  period,  and  Z'anish 
tt'ith  the  development  of  inflection.  Therefore,  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
perfected  inflectional  speech,  what  was  once  a  7cord  appears  only  as  an 
ideal  center  of  meaning.  This  7vholly  intelligible  and  consistent  view  of 
the  root  may  be  said  to  be  universally  accepted  at  the  present  day.  "  ' 

Pott  was  forced  to  believe  that  the  root  was  really  a  center  of 
meaning.  But  this  center  he  believed  to  be  purely  ideal.  That  is, 
although  the  roots  were  present  in  the  minds  of  i)rimitive  men  and 
were  copied  in  language,  there  was  nothing  corresponding  to  them 
antecedent  to  the  early  stems  and  expressed  in  language.  That  is, 
the  roots  were  to  Pott  virtually  (oiicepts  innate  in  the  primitive  minds 
and  regulative  of  eailv  lanijuage.*  If  this  were  so,  thev  must  have 
been  cmptv  and  formal.  That  is,  all  difference  would  fall  on  the 
side  of  the  linguistic  stem  and  the  unitv  on  the  side  of  the  concepts. 
But  if  the  concepts  were  emptv,  there  could  be  no  distinction  within 
them.  Consequently,  thev  could  not  be  distinguished  one  from 
another  :  nor  could  they  be  applied  to  particular  thoughts,  for  there 
would  be  no  reason  within  them  whv  thev  should  be  applied  to  one 
rather  than  to  another.  That  is,  Pott  abstracts  the  unity  of  movement 
present  in  early  thought  and  sets  it  over  against  the  particular  differ- 
ences which  have  been  differentiated.  .\  true  view  is  to  note  that  the 
unitv  present  in  the  earlv  thought  gradually  becomes  less  and  less 
clear,  until  we  are  brought  to  a  stage  in  which  a  meaning  e.\isted,  but 
not  a  meaning  indicative  of  different  objects  consciously  jiresented. 
This  u)eaning  e.xisted  in  totalities  of  experience  immediately  recog- 
nized. .-\nd  in  this  sense  we  see  that,  as  Delbriick  says,  roots  may  be 
consistently  and  intelligently  maintained. 

Thus  the  study  of  language  brings  us  to  the  same  result  as  the 
study  of  the  child.  The  discursive  movement  given  in  self-conscious 
thought  and  language  disappears  into  a  form  of  thought  in  which 
experiences  identical  with  those  which  are  expressed  in  the  impersonal 
judgment  appear.  .And  not  only  so,  but  we  have  seen  that  the  passage 
from  the  im|>ersonal  to  the  discursive  form  of  thought  occurs  in  the 
earliest  stages  of  distinctively  human  life.  That  is,  as  far  back  as  wc 
can  trace  a  distinctively  human  experience,  nominal  and  verbal  stems 
.      '  Italics  mine.  ^  Cf.  Max  Miillcr,  <»/».  cit.,  p.  1 10. 


46  THI-:    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

are  found.  But  these  point  on  to  an  earlier  and  more  primitive  stage 
of  root  forms  or  impersonal  thought.  Once  more  we  find  the  passage 
from  the  impersonal  to  the  discursive  form  of  thought  co-eval  with  a 
passage  from  a  merely  conscious  stage  to  a  stage  in  which  the  oppo- 
sition between  subject  and  object  begins  to  appear.  Impersonal 
judgments,  as  it  were,  begin  to  a])pear  just  below  the  threshold  of 
what  we  ordinarily  term  self-consciousness,  and  on  the  threshold  itself. 
In  short,  they  seem  to  form  the  connecting  link  in  thought  between 
animal  and  human  intelligence,  as  well  as  indicating  the  form  of 
experience  in  which  the  differentiation  as  a  whole  is  made. 

This  conclusion  to  which  we  have  been  led  through  the  investigation 
of  the  impersonal  judgment  should  be  compared  with  certain  results 
reached  by  Romanes  from  the  standpoint  of  comparative  psvchologv. 
From  a  close  studv  of  animal  life  he  was  led  to  believe  that  a  definite 
type  of  thought  was  present  in  the  life  of  the  higher  animals.  Through 
this  "receptual"  thought,  as  he  designated  it.  the  life  of  these 
animals  was  distinguished,  on  the  one  hand,  from  mere  sense-experi- 
ence, and,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  self-conscious  life  of  man. 

When  we  inquire  into  the  nature  of  this  receptive  process,  we  find 
that  it  corresponds  exactlv  to  what  we  have  shown  to  be  the  true  nature 
of  the  impersonal  judgment.  It  distinguishes  itself  from  sense  experi- 
ence in  that  it  is  composite,  taking  up  into  itself  the  results  of  past 
experience.  It  is  distinguished  from  distinctivelv  human  experience 
in  that  it  is  immediate  merelv.  Differences  are  felt  rather  than 
abstracted.  This  we  have  found  to  be  characteristic  of  the  impersonal 
judgment,  the  childish  "  concept,"  and  the  racial  root.  The  agreement 
in  outcome  thus  materiallv  strengthens  each  position,  and  forces  us  to 
believe  more  stronglv  than  ever  that  in  the  impersonal  we  have  the 
original  form  of  judgment  and  the  connecting  link  between  the  con- 
scious and  the  self-conscious  stages  of  experience.' 

SUMMARY   AND   CONCLUSION. 

There  remains  the  task  of  a  brief  recapitulation  of  the  general 
movement  and  outcome  of  our  investigation. 

Previous  investigations  of  the  impersonal  judgment  have  been 
unsatisfactorv   because    of    a  general  ])resuppositi(m   in    regard   to  the 

'  A  criticism  of  Romanes'  position  at  once  suggests  itself.  To  him  the  order  of 
succession  in  thought  is  that  of  percept,  recept,  concept.  For  reasons  which  will  be 
evident  from   the  whole  standpoint  of  the  essay,  percept  and  concept  arise  together. 


THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  47 

nature  of  judgment.  According  to  the  traditional  view,  all  judgment 
must  be  discursive  and  must  contain  a  subject  and  a  ])redicate.  The 
traditionalists  are  right  in  maintaining  that  we  cannot  separate  the  sub- 
ject from  the  predicate,  for  it  is  self-contradictorv  to  assert  that  we 
may  have  predication  of  nothing.  But  they  are  untrue  to  scientific 
procedure  when  they  maintain  that  all  judgments  must  conform  to  the 
discursive  tvpe.  A  form  of  judgment  in  \vhi(  h  neither  subject  nor 
predicate  appears  would  obviate  entirely  tlie  dilticulty  raised  in  regard 
to  predication.  It  has  been  felt  troiii  earliest  days  both  that  imper- 
sonals  are  real  judgments,  and  that  they  do  not  conform  to  the 
ordinary  type.  The  search  for  a  subject  has  shown  the  fruitlessness  of 
the  attempt,  for  either  no  subject  is  found  or  we  must  warp  the  natural 
meaning  of  the  proposition. 

When  we  lay  aside  all  presuppositions  and  examine  ihc  impersonal 
form  of  expression  on  its  own  basis,  we  reach  the  following  result  :  In  its 
essential  form  the  impersonal  is  the  immediate  recognition  and  asser- 
tion of  an  experience,  in  which  the  whole  is  recognized  in  its  totalit}- 
and  not  through  its  parts.  But  this  totality  graduallv  differentiates, 
until  recognition  of  the  whole  can  take  place  onlv  through  the  parts. 
Here  the  discursive  judgment  appears.  Now.  inasmuch  as  we  cannot 
assert  at  just  what  moment  the  immediate  form  of  the  impersonal 
passes  into  the  discursive  judgment,  a  mediate  form  ai)pears,  in  which 
the  symbolic  subject  indicates  a  content,  however  vague  it  may  be. 
Here,  again,  growth  changes  the  experience,  until  a  definite,  })articular 
subject  appears,  and  we  have  the  full-fledged  discursive  judgment. 

This  point  of  view  enables  us  to  harmonize  the  various  divergent 
types  of  theory.  We  can  account  for  all  the  facts  which  they  present 
without  doing  damage  to  any.  We  are  enabled  to  see  how  those  who 
asserted  that  the  experience  was  individual  and  concrete  had  ground 
for  their  assertion,  while  at  the  same  time  admitting  that  those  who 
maintained  that  the  experience  pointed  to  something  general  and  uni- 
versal had  equaUright  to  their  opinion.  Also,  we  are  enabled  to  remove 
contradictions  from  both  views  by  finding  either  that  both  subject  and 
predicate  are  lacking,  or  else  that  both  appear  in  a  vague,  schematic 
way. 

As  K;int  .say.s,  percepts  without  concepts  are  blind,  and  concepts  without  percepts  are 
empty.  Each  is  meaningless  when  taken  alone.  Percepts  present  us  with  the  dis- 
criminative side  of  the  discursive  process,  while  concepts  give  us  the  side  of  unit  v.  W  c 
cannot  have  the  one  without  the  other. 

>'     or  TUF 


48  THE    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT 

But  if  this  be  so,  our  analysis  is  of  great  importance  both  for  logic 
and  psychology. 

The  most  significant  point  as  regards  logic  is  that  the  ordinary 
view  of  the  nature  of  judgment  must  be  radically  remodeled.  The  discur- 
sive form  does  not  exhaust  judgment.  The  discursive  judgment  arises 
out  of  an  immediate  concrete  judgment  and  passes  into  an  immediate 
concrete  judgment.  When  the  impersonal  experience  has  differen- 
tiated to  such  an  extent  that,  instead  of  a  buzzing  confusion,  more  or  less 
definite  centers  of  experience  appear,  these  are  recognized  and  asserted 
in  their  totality.  When  these  in  turn  have  become  so  full  of  content 
that  friction  arises  within  them,  the  parts  are  abstracted,  and  the  whole 
is  mediated  through  them.  The  parts  become  symbolic  of  the  whole. 
But,  again,  when  differentiation  has  proceeded  so  far  that  the  symbols 
may  -be  used  with  exactness  as  regards  their  own  nature  and  the  extent 
of  their  reference,  friction  disappears,  and  we  have  once  more  an 
immediate  stage  in  judgment.  This,  however,  distinguishes  itself  from 
the  impersonal  judgment  in  that  the  whole  is  recognized  through  the 
parts,  and  both  whole  and  parts  are  exact  and  definite.' 

'Further  implications  of  the  impersonal  are  apparent. 

Much  has  been  said  concerning  the  relation  of  impersonal  and  existential  judg- 
ments. From  the  standpoint  of  our  analysis  all  judgment  is  existential.  The  imper- 
sonal takes  its  "totalities"  for  existences,  the  discursive  judgment  endeavors  to  make 
apparent  the  nature  of  the  existence  assumed  in  the  impersonal ;  while  in  the 
intuitive  stage  there  is  a  definite  assurance  that  the  experience  recognized  is  real. 
The  different  forms  of  judgment  are  thus  stages  in  our  recognition  and  exposition  of 
existence. 

But  this,  again,  involves  the  nature  of  belief  and  its  relations  to  judgment. 

In  all  judgment  there  is  an  element  of  belief,  whether  in  the  forms  of  primitive 
credulity,  of  belief  struggling  through  doubt,  or  of  belief  sothorougiily  assured  that 
its  "  what  "  and  "  why  "  are  ever  ready. 

Again,  judgment  mediates  and  grounds  belief,  while  belief  connects  all  judgment 
with  reality.  The  criterion  for  the  truth  of  judgment  must  be  the  criterion  for  the 
worth  of  belief.  To  sav  that  all  judgment  is  existential  is,  therefore,  but  to  say  that 
thought  as  such  believes  that  it  has  to  do  with  reality. 

Such  a  view  would  lead  us  to  believe  that  since  all  judgment  is  recognition  or 
assertion  of  realitv,  that  the  criterion  for  the  truth  of  judgment,  and  the  worth  of  belief, 
cannot  lie  in  judgment  or  in  belief.  Judgment  and  belief  both  land  us  in  the 
hypothetical  stage.  How  do  we  pass  to  verification?  If  the  scientific  position  be 
true,  all  verification  comes  through  action — the  testing  of  our  hypotheses  by  crucial  expe- 
riments. Judgment  and  belief  simply  prepare  us  for  action.  In  this  preparation 
judgment  provides  the  mediation  ;  belief,  the  motive.  Through  thought  we  become 
convinced  or  believe  that  realitv  is  such  as  we  take  it  to  be,  and  that,  if  we  act 
according  to   our  belief,    we   shall  gain  certain  experiences   defined    and    expected 


Tin;    IMPERSONAL    JUDGMENT  49 

'I'urning  to  psvchologv,  our  outcome  has  been  that  the  impersonal 
judijmenl  forms  the  connectiiu'"  link  between  conscious  and  self- 
conscious  experience  in  the  adult,  the  child,  and  the  race. 

Conscious  experience  bei^ins  in  vague  indefiniteness,  and  it  is  long 
before  anv  definite  image  or  center  is  recognized.  Hut  images  or 
centers  as  totalities  do  finally  appear.  These  become  more  definite 
and  overlap  in  the  uniiv  of  the  life  mediation  ;  then  the  mind  is  forced 
to  the  recognition  of  wholes  through  their  parts.  'I'his  recognition  of 
wholes  brings  to  clear  consciousness  the  nature  of  the  activitv  as  a 
unitv  amid  differences,  as  a  process  making  use  of  means  and  ends. 
In  short,  consciousness  now  becomes  self-consciousness.  .Ml  further 
development  is  that  of  the  personality  which  has  been  produced.  It 
is  a  process  working  bv  means  and  through  ends.  When  the  recog- 
nition of  the  means  for  anv  end  has  become  perfect,  and  we  can 
immediatelv  control  them,  the  richest  form  of  self-consciousness  in 
what  we  have  called  expert  action  appears.  Whole  and  parts,  end  and 
means,  subject  and  object, are  one  definite,  unified  existence.  Such  states 
mav,  perhaps,  be  rare,  but  thev  are  seen  in  the  musician  lost  in  his 
music,  in  that  perfection  of  thought  in  which  we  are  lost  to  all  about 
us,  in  the  expert  plaver  who  in  tlic  midst  of  the  game  must  constantly 
adjust  himself  to  new  conditions. 

in  thought  and  belief.  If  we  do  get  them,  then,  we  take  it.  our  thought  is  true,  and 
our  belief  is  assured.  Hut  this  means  that  we  have  come  back  to  experiencing, 
through  experience  defined,  directed,  anil  tested.  Of  this  direct  experiencing  both 
judgment  and  belief  are  phases. 

Now  the  question  comes.  What  is  the  relation  of  the  Real  to  the  fact  of  expe- 
riencing ?  Is  Reality  Experiencing  ?  This  opens  up  a  fundamental  metaphysical 
problem.  The  aspects  of  the  prolilem  twine  and  intertwine,  and  seem  to  liml  their 
origin  and  outcome  in  the  impersonal  and  intuitive  judgments. 

This  point  of  view  suggests  a  further  problem,  viz..  the  development  of  the  self 
from  mere  experiencing  through  the  impersonal  and  subject-object  stages  to  tiie 
intuitive  stage  of  which  we  are  conscious  at  times. 

Our  view  of  the  judgment  would  suggest  the  reduction  of  thought,  action,  and 
impulse  to  one  developing  life  movement.  The  inner  nature  of  this  movement 
would  be  given  in  an  analvsis  of  the  different  stages,  wliile  the  process  of  growth 
would  be  best  seen  by  a  section  of  the  various  layers. 

This,  however,  is  a  further  problem. 


